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Chapter 1 
Mitigation Polices in Developing Countries: Evidence from the 
CGE literature 
1.1. Introduction 
Even though, excluding China, India and Indonesia, developing countries are minor 
contributors to global GHGs emissions, their participation to mitigation effort is crucial as 
emission growth in the future will mainly be attributed to them if the current  growth paths 
are maintained (Bluffstone, 2003; Jotzo, 2005). In fact, nowadays, developing countries, even 
those with negligible share of global emissions, intend to contribute to limiting global 
warming and appear well aware of the potential environmental benefits and improvements in 
the quality of development that can be derived from mitigation actions. This fact is clearly 
reflected in the 21stUNFCCCconference conducted in December 2015 in Paris3 where 195 
countries adopted a global, yet voluntary, climate agreement which sets out a global action 
plan to combat climate change.  One distinctive trait of this landmark agreement is to remove 
the strict differentiation between developed and developing countries characterizing the past 
international climate change negotiations. It introduces a “common” framework based on 
historic, current and future emission responsibilities that commits all countries to engage in 
mitigations according to “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions” (INDCs4). All 
developing countries including Ethiopia have submitted their INDCs to the UNFCCC 
secretariat. As of April 4, 2016, a total of 161 INDCs covering 189 parties5 have been 
                                                 
3The Paris agreement’s main aim is to keep a global temperature rise in this century well below 2 
degrees Celsius and, if possible, to drive efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2016). 
 
4 INDCs are national emission reduction plans meant to achieve the shared goal of limiting climate change set in 
the Paris agreement.  The Paris agreement focuses on the implementation of nationally determined contributions 
between 2020 and 2030 (Janet & James, 2016). 
5 The INDC of the European Union and its 28 member States is counted as one INDC representing 29 Parties 
(the European Union and its 28 member States) (UNFCCC, 2016) 
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submitted to the secretariat (UNFCCC, 2016). The Paris agreement is operational 
notwithstanding the US position.  
The Paris agreement is just the last of many examples of environmental policies that need to 
be scrutinized to identify costs and benefits, direct and indirect social and economic 
implications. This is particularly important for developing countries that need to balance the 
benefits of climate action against potential hurdles to their prospects for growth, development 
and poverty reduction. It is however relevant also for developed countries, even though there 
the concerns are more focused on guarding competitiveness and employment. 
A variety of analytical approaches have been used for this purpose. Among these, economic 
model-based assessments play a paramount role (Lu, 2012; Pempetzoglou & Stella, 2008) 
and, among modelling assessments, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have 
been widely applied.  
Elements of popularity of CGE models are their capacity to analyze the macroeconomic 
effect of a policy considering the multiplicity of interactions linking markets domestically 
and internationally, coupled with a tradition of policy support that can be traced back to the 
‘50s (Mitra-Kahn & Benjamin, 2008) that make them “somewhat” familiar to policy making. 
This survey reviews the modeling literature applying CGE models to the study of climate 
change mitigation policies, with a particular focus on the analyses conducted on developing 
countries.  
In what follows, section 1.2 outlines the existing economic models for the analysis of 
mitigation policies, section 1.3 reviews the cost of mitigation policies in developing and 
emerging economies, and section 1.4 concludes. 
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1.2. Economic Models for the Analysis of Mitigation Policies  
Mitigation policies, aiming to reduce GHG emissions, impact the activity of key sectors of 
the economy like energy production, transportation, agriculture and construction. 
Accordingly, they bring about consequences that affect the macro-economic context and 
influence GDP, sectorial allocation of production, country competitiveness, welfare and 
poverty.  
To analyze these potential effects, the economic discipline makes ample use of modelling 
approaches. Albeit highly differentiated, they share the idea to represent, simplifying the 
structural functioning of the economic system, on the basis of different theoretical constructs 
in order to determine what might happen in different scenarios or at a future date. 
The literature proposes many criteria to classify different models based upon their theoretical 
structure, assumptions and the treatment of different variables. A first important classification 
distinguishes Bottom-Up vs Top-Down Models. Bottom-up models are more “engineering-
like”or “partial equilibrium”. This characterization mainly defines energy models 
representing in detail a huge number of alternative technological options used for harnessing 
energy resources and convert them into energy services. Examples of bottom-up models 
include the MARKAL-TIMES family (see e.g. (Dolf & Chen, 2001)), EFOM (Hannele & 
Sami, 2004)), AIM/end-use (Mikiko, Yuzuru, & Tsuneyuki, 2000). 
The Top-Down category groups all those models that share an “economic”, “systemic” 
perspective. That is: they aim to provide a comprehensive picture of the functioning of the 
economic system based on the behaviour of representative agents “shaped” according to the 
underpinnings of different economic theories. On their turn, top-down models can be 
classified into, macro-econometric models, dynamic/ growth models and CGE models. 
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Macro-econometric models typically consist in huge systems of dynamic equations 
representing the evolution of demand and supply relations determined and validated by past 
empirical observations. The fewer theoretical assumptions and the empirical derivation 
enable macro-econometric models to treat with more flexibility departures from perfect 
competition, e.g. accounting for market power and bargaining processes. Nonetheless, their 
requirement of long time series data for estimation makes their application quite difficult 
especially in the context of developing countries (Barker & Johnstone, 1998). Indeed, in the 
literature, studies on environmental policies using these models are relatively less frequent 
(see in this vein (Barker, Foxon, & Scrieciu, 2008; Barker, Junankar, Pollitt, & Summerton, 
2007; Bossier, Bracke, & Vanhorebeek, 2002; Ekins & Unnada, 2012; Pollitt & Thoung, 
2009)). 
The literature using dynamic optimization and computable general equilibrium models is 
wider. Dynamic growth models are based on the paradigm of neoclassical or modern growth 
theory. These models, often developed into Integrated Assessment Models with the additions 
of climate/environmental modules, have been extensively applied to the study of optimal 
abatement policies, energy and carbon efficiency policies ( (Nordhaus & Boyer, 2000) is a 
prominent example of this stream of literature). Many of them can incorporate strategic 
behaviours of different countries/regions. They have thus been also used to study the 
feasibility and sustainability of international environmental agreements (Bosetti, Carraro, De 
Cian, Massetti, & Tavoni, 2011). They are however very “aggregated”: often depict one 
sector in the economy missing endogenous price adjustments and the 
intersectoral/international trade dimension. 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have many characteristics that make them 
particularly appropriate to the environmental policy analysis (Bergman, 2005; Böhringer & 
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Loschel, 2006; Conrad, 2002). Firstly, they provide an explicit representation of domestic and 
international market interactions that, coupled with endogenous price formation, allows to 
track direct and indirect impacts of a policy shock on the whole economy including feedback 
and rebound effects (Sue Wing, 2009). Secondly, they compound macro-economic theory 
with micro-foundations allowing to analyze a policy at different levels e.g. country and 
sectoral (Böhringer, Conrad, & Löschel, 2003). Furthermore, and related to this, even though 
CGE  models can be very complex, their solid theoretical background helps the interpretation 
of  results in terms of “fundamental” economic mechanisms (Xie & S., 2000). Finally, GGE 
models are flexible. In principle they can simulate many different economic shocks as long as 
they are translated in a supply or demand changes.  
Accordingly, it is not surprising that CGE models are widely applied to the investigation of 
international and national climate change policies, building a more than extended literature (a 
partial scrutiny includes e.g. (Garbaccio, Ho, & Jorgenson, 1999) and (Liang, Fan, & Wei, 
2007) for China, (Wissema & Dellink, 2007) for Ireland, (Pempetzoglou & Stella, 2008) for 
Greece, (Bucher, 2009) for  Switzerland, (Al-Amin, Abdul, & Chamhuri, 2008) for  
Malaysia, (Ciaschini, Pretaroli, Severini, & Soccia, 2011) for Italy (2011), (Meng, 
Siriwardana, & McNeill, 2013) for Australia, (Wachirarangsrikul, Sorapipatana, Puttanapong, 
& Chontanawat, 2013) for Thailand, (Allan, Lecca, McGregor, & Swales, 2014) for Scotland, 
(Nurdianto & Resosudarmo, 2016) for ASEAN, (Alton, Arndt, Davies, Hartley, & Makrelov, 
2014; Van Heerden, Blignaut, Bohlmann, Cartwright, Diederichs, & Mander, 2016) for South 
Africa). 
1.3. The Use of CGE models to assess the economic cost of mitigation policies 
in developing and emerging countries 
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Compared to the extensive application of CGE models to study mitigation policies in 
developed countries, their application to developing countries is much more limited. Those 
limited studies have been addressed mostly to emerging countries. Among these, the bulk of 
works focuses on China and South Africa, with few researches tackling other Asian countries 
and none African countries. 
The pioneer and land mark work in this vein can be considered Shah and Larsen (1992) on 
Pakistan. The authors noted that a $10 per ton carbon tax burden fell with income, turning out 
to be regressive. Such regressivity was less pronounced, but still present, if measured against 
household expenditure. Shah and Larsen (1992) concluded that lower income groups need to 
be protected with direct subsidies or alternative measures. Tarr & Jensen (2002), reported a 
somewhat similar result showing that removing subsidies on domestic energy products would 
have a regressive effect on Iranian households. 
(Lu, 2012), applying a static CGE model indicated that the introduction of a carbon tax of 
300 RMB¥ per ton of Carbon in China would reduce significantly emission (by 22%) leading 
to just marginal decrease in major macroeconomic indicators such as consumption, exports, 
and production. Similar conclusion are reached by earlier works applying recursive dynamic 
CGE models like the ones by Zhang (1998) on the macroeconomic effects of CO2 emission 
limits and that by Liang, Fan & Wei (2007) on Carbon taxation Policy in China.  
More recently, Zhou, Shi, Li, & Yuan ( 2011) using a dynamic CGE model iterate the 
relatively low cost of emission reduction in China. According to the authors, reducing 
emissions by 12.26% compared to the baseline in 2020, would result in a decline of GDP by 
0.39% and of household income by 1.45% in 2020. The study also points out the importance 
of tax revenues recycling schemes showing a huge potential to alleviate negative impacts on 
households. Mu, Wang, and Cai (2017) are the first to address specifically the impacts of 
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China's 2030 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC): a reduction in the 
carbon intensity of GDP by 60% to 65% from the 2005 levels in 2030. The total economic 
cost required ranges from 0.11% to 0.43% of GDP by 2030. The study further indicates that 
the implementation of a national carbon market is efficient in reducing the compliance costs 
of INDC targets, while the deployment of renewable power helps to create employment 
opportunities and reduce permit prices in the carbon market. Moreover, it was emphasized 
that the hidden health benefits of China's INDC can offset much of the compliance costs. 
Al-Amin, Abdul Hamid, and Chamhuri (2008) analyzed the effects of output-specific carbon 
tax on the Malaysian economy using a static CGE model. Besides using a static CGE, their 
treatment of emissions is somewhat simplified, as in their model, emissions depend linearly 
upon the levels of output rather than being associated to the carbon content of the inputs.  
This said, they found that the reduction in emissions is proportional to the reduction in output 
levels (the implemented carbon tax resulted in the same percentage changes in production 
and emissions, 1.21% each).  
 Ojha (2009), based on a CGE model for the Indian Economy, has found that a domestic 
carbon tax policy imposes heavy costs to the economy in terms of lower economic growth 
and higher poverty. However, the negative impact can be reduced if the emission restriction 
target is modest and carbon tax revenues are transferred exclusively to the poor.  
Corong (2008) assessed the potential impacts of a tax reform in the Philippines that shifts 
revenue rising from trade tariffs, liberalizing trade, to carbon taxes and emission reduction 
combining a CGE model with household micro simulation data. According to the results, the 
carbon tax is able to compensate all tariff revenues lost during the trade liberalisation process, 
while reducing poverty and increasing welfare of the people at the same time. 
 8 | P a g e  
 
 Yusuf & Resosudarmo (2015) developed a static CGE assessment, studying the effect on 
Indonesia of imposing a carbon tax that would induce a 6.6% emission reduction. In this case, 
the GDP decline would be really minimal (0.04% and 0.03% under no-recycling and 
recycling of the carbon tax revenues to households respectively).  This encouraging result 
supporting the implementation of abatement policies in a developing country, however, also 
assumes a modest mitigation goal. Moreover, their distributional analysis with highly 
disaggregated household groups concluded that the implementation of carbon tax would not 
be necessarily regressive even if the tax revenue is not recycled. It was in fact progressive in 
rural areas and neutral in urban areas with an overall progressive distributional effect. Among 
alternative revenue recycling schemes, lump-sum transfers were found to produce a much 
more favorable distributional impact in terms of equity objectives. 
Nurdianto and Resosudarmo (2016) analysed the economy-wide impact of carbon tax in 
South East Asian Nations using a CGE model with disaggregated household groups. They 
found that the implementation of carbon tax that would reduce emissions by 3-4% would 
result in a 0.3% increase in real GDP in Malaysia and Indonesia and a 0.2% reduction in Real 
GDP  in the other member countries. However, this happens at a cost in terms of reduction in 
welfare, and this is so irrespectively of revenue recycling schemes.  
Durand-Lasserve, Campagnolo, Chateau, & Dellink (2015), indirectly supported the 
progressivity of carbon taxation in Indonesia. They used a dynamic CGE model, integrating 
10,000 representative household groups to examine the effect of fossil fuel subsidy removal 
and they found effects to be progressive. The  results also showed  that  the  redistribution 
scheme  ultimately  matters  in  determining  the  overall  distributional  performance  of the 
policy.  Cash transfers are found to make the reform more attractive for poorer households.  
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Raitzer, Bosello, Tavoni, Orecchia, Marangoni  &  Nuella  (2015) conducted a CGE regional 
study for 5 developing Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam  testing the economic implication of different GHG concentration stabilization 
scenarios. Macroeconomic costs of emission reductions are not negligible ranging between 
the 2.5%–3.5% of regional GDP over the 2010–2050 period in the 500 parts per million 
(ppm) stabilization scenario. This is the more ambitious scenario considered by the study, but 
it is anyway less stringent than what would be implied by the Paris agreement. Although the 
economic costs of such stabilization policies are substantive, benefits and co benefit of 
climate action are found to far exceed them. 
Turning to Africa, South Africa is the only country where the economic costs of climate 
change mitigation policies have been conducted. This country is also the only African 
country having adopted a carbon tax. The first study in chronological order is by Van 
Heerden, et al. (2006) that used a static multi household CGE model of South Africa to 
explore the potential for a ‘double or triple dividend’, arising from alternative uses of the 
revenues raised from a range of energy/environmental taxes. They found the possibility to 
reap a “triple dividend6” when environmental tax revenues were recycled through a reduction 
in food prices. This result flags, once again, the paramount importance of revenue recycling 
schemes in determining the overall and distributional effect of the policy.  
Second, is the work of Pauw (2007) where an economy-wide modeling was applied to the 
2000 Social South African Accounting Matrix to simulate the effects of emission taxes. The 
results are in line with Van Heerden et al. (2006)indicating on the one hand that emission 
taxes pose significant costs to the economy,  but, on the other hand, that costs could be 
minimized if the emission tax revenues are recycled in the form of food subsidies.  
                                                 
6 The three dividends in their study: First one is reduction in emissions, second one is increase in GDP, and third 
one is decrease in poverty. 
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Devarajan, Go, Robinson, & Thierfelde (2011) simulated different tax policies to reduce 
South Africa carbon emissions by 15% percent. They showed that, in a “first-best” economy, 
a carbon tax outperforms other energy taxes in curbing emissions at the lowest possible cost. 
This study introduced originally labor market distortions, showing that eventually these are 
the major determinants of carbon tax costs, even more important than the country’s own 
carbon emissions.  
Alton, Arndt, Davies, Hartley, & Makrelov (2014), employed a recursive dynamic CGE, to 
assess the cost of  achieving the South African 42% emissions reductions target from the 
business as usual set for 2025. GDP contraction results the 1.2%, however authors found that 
carbon tax revenues targeted to expand social transfers lead to strongly progressive welfare 
outcomes. 
The fifth and most recent study is the work of Van Heerden, Blignaut, Bohlmann, Cartwright, 
Diederichs, & Mander (2016). It assesses the possible impacts of the carbon tax proposal 
announced by South Africa’s National Treasury in May 2013 and set out in the draft carbon 
tax bill published in Dec 2015. The novelty of the study is to link the CGE model to a 
detailed electricity-generation model. The results eventually suggest that a carbon tax is an 
effective tool in reducing South Africa’s emissions with considerable economic cost but the 
negative economic impact is greatly reduced when the tax revenue is recycled. 
1.4. Conclusion 
The literature surveyed in general demonstrates that carbon taxes in developing countries are 
economically costly, though somehow moderated when the carbon tax revenues are recycled. 
Moreover, the distributional impact of mitigation policies in developing countries, though 
some studies have indicated it to be progressive, is quite mixed and less conclusive than for 
developed countries.  The findings also appear to favour using the carbon tax revenue to 
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subsidise households in order to minimise the economic and distributional costs of the policy. 
Therefore, more studies are needed with reference to developing countries to come arrive at 
more definite conclusion about the progressivity of carbon tax in developing countries. More 
importantly, due to the peculiar characteristics of the Ethiopian economy, the results in other 
developing countries may not hold for Ethiopia. On top of that, none of the studies in the 
literature considered an emission reduction target that is as ambitious7 as Ethiopia. For a 
country that affirmed and communicated its emission reduction plan to the international 
community, a quantitative assessment of the potential economy-wide effects of such plan is 
unambiguously required. Hence, studies specific to Ethiopia are crucially important. 
Moreover, this study contributes to the literature by employing a dynamic CGE model given 
that most of the studies in developing countries employed a static one.  
  
                                                 
7Ethiopia’s set an ambitious emission reduction target equal to 64% of the business as usual projection in 2030. 
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Chapter 2 
Economic and Environmental Effects of INDC Policies for Ethiopia (A 
Recursive Dynamic CGE Analysis) 
Abstract 
 
Mitigation of climate change has become unavoidable discussion item in policy making agendas in 
both developed and developing counties. Having understood the important role played by developing 
nations in fighting against climate change, Ethiopia submitted its Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDC) to the UNFCCC secretariat with an emission reduction goal of 64% in 2030 
compared to the BAU scenario. 
 
The main objective of this study is to analyse the economic and environmental effects of the 
implementation of Ethiopia’s INDC policy in the form of carbon tax.  In doing so, a recursive 
dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is employed and is calibrated on the updated 
2009/10 SAM of Ethiopia with the corresponding emission data of the same year. 
 
Four simulation scenarios have been introduced. In the first simulation, carbon tax revenue has been 
allocated entirely for government consumption, whereas in the second simulation, the carbon tax 
revenue has been equally divided between government consumption and households in form of lump 
sum transfer. In the third and fourth simulations, productivity gains from government expenditure 
allocated to health and education sectors are combined with the respective first two simulations. The 
results of simulation experiments on selected macroeconomic variables indicate that, in real terms, 
GDP, national absorption and household consumption are found to be adversely affected relative to 
the baseline scenario, the impact being considerably high in the first simulation. The simulations with 
productivity gains, in relative sense, have improved the negative effects of the carbon tax abatement 
policy on the economic variables. The implication of this is that policies that increase productivity of 
government expenditure have better spillover effects on GDP than those of household consumption.  
 
Finally, to achieve the emission reduction target set out in the INDC policy of Ethiopia with 
reasonable cost to the economy, the country has to invest in clean technologies that are meant to 
improve emission efficiency as most of the emissions emanate from activities in the agricultural 
sector, and for this end, huge international support is required. 
 
Keywords: Emission, INCD, carbon tax, Simulation, baseline, climate change, economy, environment, 
CGE Model, Ethiopia 
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2.1. Introduction and Background 
Nowadays, the concept of economic growth is increasingly linked to the idea of sustainability 
where the environmental dimension plays a major role. One of the major challenges that 
unsustainable use of the environment poses to social and economic growth is climate change. 
It is caused by the accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere stemming 
from the use of fossil fuels, that alters atmosphere’s chemical composition, increase 
temperature (global warming), induce variations in the atmospheric, ocean and earth cycles 
with adverse and sometimes potentially catastrophic consequences for human social-
economic systems and development opportunities. Among these are: loss of wild life, 
drought, floods, changes in mortality and morbidity associated to many diseases, degradation 
of natural resources and loss of agricultural productivity (IPCC, 2014). Eventually, not only 
global economy is concerned, but also potentially future fate of life’s survival on earth. This 
poses an urgent need to mitigate its causes and adapt to its adverse effects. 
Climate change is a global externality. Irrespectively of who contributes and the degree of 
her/his contribution, all experience its adverse effects. Accordingly, an effective climate 
change policy aiming to GHG emission reduction requires both a concerted international 
response and national efforts (FDRE, 2011).   
Global efforts to reduce the adverse effect of climate change led to the development of a long 
lasting international negotiation process starting with the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The first (and at the moment unique) global 
binding emission reduction commitment produced, is the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. It classifies 
countries by their level of industrialization and commits the so called “ANNEX I” countries, 
basically developed and transitional economies to reduce their emissions by an average of 5% 
below 1990 levels over the period 2008 to 2012 (the first commitment period). Non ANNEX 
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I countries, coinciding with the developing world, were not imposed binding emission 
reduction limits under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that developing countries have not a crucial role to play in 
emission reduction. Leaving aside the many and large co-benefits from mitigation primarily 
in the form of better health (Stern, 2008), developing countries represent (a) a large share of 
GHG abatement potential that (b) could be accessible at a relatively low cost. This is because 
the marginal abatement cost is relatively lower in developing countries than in developed 
countries where the technology is, on average more efficient and less energy/carbon 
intensive, makes further reductions more difficult (Landis & Bernauer, 2012; Lopez, 1999). 
Accordingly, developing countries’ involvement in the abatement effort responds both to 
efficiency and to effectiveness principles. In fact, a considerable number of developing 
countries, including Ethiopia, are participating to the international climate negotiation process 
to shape mitigation and adaptation efforts also in the post-Kyoto period. The major and more 
recent outcome of this process is the submission of Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) at the 2015 Paris climate conference, the 21st international negotiation 
round on climate policies.  
The key outcome of the conference was an “inspirational” agreement to limit global warming 
to well below 2 degree Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels. To this end, member states 
submit their respective and voluntary INDCs to the convention setting the first steps to that 
achievement. The Paris conference also iterates that the costs of mitigation falls primarily on 
developed countries who have contributed the most to the problem and set the importance of 
international support from developed to more vulnerable and with limited capacity 
developing countries both in the areas of mitigation and adaptation (FDRE, 2011) UNFCCC, 
2015).     
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A perfect example of this high vulnerability/limited capacity combination is Ethiopia: the 
country is heavily dependent upon climate sensitive sectors, like livestock and rain-fed 
agriculture, large share of the country are prone to desertification and drought, and it has 
limited economic and institutional resources for adaptation with having one of the lowest per 
capita incomes in the world.  
As a responsible member of the world community, Ethiopia is aware of the important role 
that developing countries can play in fighting climate change, and has consequently taken on 
a constructive role in international climate negotiations. Ethiopia’s ambition to become a 
“green economy front-runner” is an expression of its potential for and belief in a sustainable 
model of growth. To this end, the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, has initiated in 2011 the Climate-Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) initiative 
aimed at reducing future emissions to protect the country from the adverse effects of climate 
change and to build a green economy that will help realize its ambition of reaching middle 
income status before 2025 (FDRE, 2011). In practice the CRGE aims at keeping 2030 
emissions to their levels in 2010. The target is very ambitious as according to projections 
under Ethiopian business as usual scenario, greenhouse gas emissions are expected to 
increase strongly, from 150 Mt CO2e in 2010 to 400 Mt CO2e in 2030. 
In its Paris INDCs, the country restated that it intends to reduce 2030 emissions by 255 
mtCO2e from the BAU scenario which represents a 64% reduction. Against this background, 
there is an urgent need for a quantitative assessment that takes into account direct and indirect 
effects of the various CRGE-related interventions in the country (FDRE, 2015; UN, 2015) . 
One “typical” leverage to reduce emissions, advocated by the economic discipline, is the use 
of carbon taxes (Angelopoulos, Economides, & Philippopoulos, 2010; Crane & Bartis, 2007; 
Full, 2012). Economists and international organizations have been suggesting market based 
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instruments in general and carbon tax in particular to reduce emissions due to their higher 
efficiency than command-and-control measures. Carbon taxes are price based policy 
instruments intended to increase the price of carbon intensive goods and services thereby 
decreasing the quantity demanded and/or produced. 
Advantages of carbon taxes are, in principle, manifold: Efficiency stems from the fact that 
they fix the same marginal cost for carbon emissions for all and allow quantities emitted from 
the different sources to adjust accordingly. As a consequence, the distribution of abatement 
effort is “automatically” regulated by the “market” imposing higher abatement to those more 
able to do so. They require a lower degree of public sector intervention. Once the tax is fixed, 
the quantities self-adjust with lower administrative costs compared to tradable permits. When 
we say this, it should be noted that this theory of efficiency may not be fully reflected when it 
comes to implementation especially in developing countries.  Moreover Like other taxes, they 
generate revenues that could find different and useful usages, but differently from other taxes 
they correct a market failure (excessive externalities from emission) thus imposing a desired 
distortion to the price system, rather than an unwanted one as the case of distortionary 
taxation on non-externality-generating activities e.g. labour (Dower & Zimmerman, 1992; 
Goulder & Schein, 2013; Nordhaus W. D., 2006; Stern, 2008). 
Finally, carbon taxes tend to minimize the regulatory mistakes in the presence of uncertainty. 
Nonetheless, levying carbon taxes is a thorny issue. The primary reason refraining countries 
from adopting such policies is the uncertainty associated with effects on economic growth, 
international competitiveness, welfare and equity. In Particular, developing nations such as 
Ethiopia fear undesirable consequences on economic growth and poverty reduction which are 
its top priorities.  
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Empirical literature, concentrating mostly on developed countries, suggests that imposition of 
a carbon tax would decrease carbon emissions significantly and might not dramatically 
reduce economic growth (Allan, Lecca, McGregor, & Swales, 2014; Meng, Siriwardana, & 
McNeill, 2013; Susanne & Henrik, 2015). Limited number of studies is found in developing 
countries in general and sub-Saharan Africa in Particular. From those scant studies, Al-Amin, 
Abdul, & Chamhuri (2008), with the objective of examining the economic impact and 
effectiveness of carbon tax, simulated an output specific carbon tax on the Malaysian 
economy using a static Computable General Equilibrium model. They found that the 
simulated carbon tax reduced emissions and output by the same percentage changes (both by 
1.21%).  However, apart from using static CGE, this study is rather simplistic in the 
representation of emission processes assuming emissions are linearly related to the levels of 
output, neglecting the role of inputs characteristics. A computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
simulation study by (Alton, Arndt, Davies, Hartley, & Makrelov, 2014) on the South African 
economy analyzed the implementation of a CO2 tax consistent with the national emission 
reduction target of 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025 relative to the ‘‘business-as-usual’’. The 
results indicated moderate adverse impact on GDP (-1.23%) and national absorption (-1.20%) 
in 2025. However, this study is not comprehensive in the sense that emissions other than CO2 
were excluded from the analysis. 
The present study will contribute to the literature of the economy-wide effects of carbon tax 
in developing countries in general and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. It is the first of this 
kind focusing on Ethiopian economy and will provide useful information to support the 
implementation of the country’s Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy as well 
as the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions especially for the second Growth and 
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transformation Plan (GTP-II) of Ethiopia (2015 to 2020) where the government is planning to 
mainstream CRGE and INDCs with much more emphasis (FDRE, 2011; FDRE, 2015). 
In particular, by developing and applying an Ethiopian-tailored, dynamic computable general 
equilibrium model, this study aims to examine the effect of emission tax on 
 Key macroeconomic variables 
 Sectoral allocation of production 
 Household income 
 Emission Levels 
2.2. Model Description and Extensions 
The study tailors the recursive-dynamic International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
CGE model (Lofgren, Harris, & Robinson, 2002) to the socio-economic and emission 
characteristics of Ethiopia. IFPRI designed the model to contribute to and facilitate the use of 
CGE models for policy analysis in developing countries. Even though the CGE model seems 
standard, it includes some of the basic features designed to reflect the characteristics of a 
developing country such as household consumption of non-marketed (or home.) 
commodities, explicit treatment of transaction costs, and a separation between production 
activities and commodities that allows any activity to produce multiple commodities and any 
commodity to be produced by multiple activities (Lofgren, Harris, & Robinson, 2002). Its 
specification follows the neoclassical-structuralist modeling tradition presented in Dervis et 
al. (1982). 
The CGE approach is chosen because of its ability to integrate into a systemic perspective 
economic theory with real world data (Conrad, 2002). In particular CGE models provide a 
multi sector representation of the economic systems taking into account market transmission 
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mechanisms triggered by endogenous adjustments in relative prices. As such, they are 
particularly appropriate to study the effect of taxation policies which typically entail higher 
order macroeconomic effects (Lofgren, Harris, & Robinson, 2002; Thurlow, 2008). When 
adapted to Ethiopian data, the model features 46 production activities of the economy with 50 
commodities, and, particularly interesting for the present analysis, it considers multiple 
household types. In this exercise, rural poor, urban poor, rural non-poor, urban non-poor are 
considered.  
2.2.1. Model extensions 
That model has been extended with the following additions:  
-Inclusion of all emissions8 and related equations tying emissions with respective sources. 
GHG emissions data are derived from the Environmental Economics Policy Forum for 
Ethiopia (EEPFE). We treat emissions in two different ways depending on their type: 
stationary emissions and activity emissions. Stationary emissions (for production sectors and 
households) are emissions whose sources are identifiable from the SAM data. For production 
sectors, these emissions are inputs-based: they are associated to the amount of energy input 
used in the production. Emissions data allow the computation of the emission coefficient 
representing the amount of emissions per birr worth of energy input. Then the model 
computes stationary emissions from production sectors by multiplying the amount of input 
used by the emission coefficient. Similarly, stationary emissions from households are linked 
with the consumption of energy goods by the household sector, via a pre-calculated emission 
intensity coefficient from the emission data matrix.  However, due to the fact that an 
enormous share of emissions of the country comes from agriculture, stationary emissions 
                                                 
8 The major GHGs in the Ethiopia are (CO2, CH4 and N2O) which this study covers. This is one new feature of 
this study as many other studies include only CO2 in their analysis. For methodological convenience, the study 
used emission data measured in tones of CO2 equivalent (CO2e). That means, scientifically accepted conversion 
factors are used to convert all other classifications of GHGs in to CO2 
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account negligible share of emissions. The second category of emissions, those whose 
sources are not identifiable from the model database (i.e. social accounting matrix or SAM), 
are linked to activity output/household consumption. (The calculation of emission 
coefficients and emission linking with the model are described in the methodological 
appendix) 
-Inclusion of carbon taxes. Emission tax is entered into the model as a price of 
emission per ton of CO2e.  
The price of emission multiplied by the corresponding sector and household 
specific emissions give rise to emission tax revenue which is zero in the baseline.   
Emission tax also appears as an activity tax and added as a production cost in the activity cost 
function of the producer. Hence it affects the profit maximizing decision of the production 
activities.  This variable also affects the government’s budget balance. The same thing 
applies to the households’ problem thereby affecting the households’ income and 
consumption expenditure).  
-Use of Socio- economic data for Ethiopia. In addition to emission data, all the data referring 
to the Ethiopian economic system have been utilized. The study makes use of the updated 
2009/10 Ethiopian SAM developed by Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) and 
of emission data (which include CO2, CH4 and N2O) consistent with SAM accounts and 
disaggregated by sources, developed by Environmental Economics Policy Forum for Ethiopia 
(EEPFE). These data (reporting a total of 174.55 mt CO2e) are different from those reported 
in the CRGE strategy document (150 mt CO2e) due to the inclusion of GHG emissions from 
households, not part of CRGE strategy and differences in method of computation with 
EEPFE.  
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2.3. Simulations and Results 
2.3.1. Description of Simulations 
In the CGE modeling exercise, we focus on the differential dynamic impacts of different 
levels of carbon tax relative to that of the counterfactual (baseline). 
Baseline (Counterfactual) Scenario   
This scenario is used as a “no additional-policy” reference point where the economy is 
assumed to grow along the recent economic performance and evaluated at times where the 
present policy environment is maintained. The time period under consideration is 2010 - 
2030. For each year, the model is updated to reflect changes in population, supply of labor 
and land, and factor productivity. 
Many different sources are available to build the baseline. An authoritative one is the IPCC 
scenario building exercise originating the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways or SSPs (O'Neill, 
et al., 2014). These provide country level prospects for population, economic growth, 
urbanization, land use etc. up to 2100 under different “storylines” of social economic 
development. 
For this exercise we prefer however to use Ethiopian national sources for the projections 
hoping they are more adherent to the country features and also because they can be more 
acceptable by Ethiopian policy environments. 
The assumptions are thus based on the recent economic performance and the projections of 
central statistical agency and ministry of finance and economic development of Ethiopia 
(CSA, 2011; MoFED, 2010). 
Over the study period, a number of counter factual changes are expected to happen.  Some of 
these changes, which constitute the baseline growth path of the economy, include exogenous 
growth in population, labour supply, total factor productivity and government spending. For 
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instance, Population grows by 2.6% per year which is consistent with the recent average 
growth rate (CSA, 2011). Labor supply is assumed to grow at a slightly higher annual rate of 
3% (CSA, 2011. Different growth rates of TFP are assumed to prevail in different production 
activities based on estimates obtained from previous studies on growth accounting in the 
country (Pratt & Yu, 2008; Fantu, 2012; Mulugeta, 2015). Government spending and 
transfers are also exogenously increased under the baseline based on their historic growth 
rates. The process of capital accumulation is modeled endogenously based on Thurlow 
(2008).  GDP, Population and emission growth projections are based on MoFED, CSA  and 
the Ethiopian Climate Resilient Green Economy strategy along with EEPFE.  
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The initial values of some variables of Ethiopia are summarized hereunder (Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1 Initial values of GDP, population and emissions9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ethiopian 2009/10 Social Accounting Matrix, CSA10, MoFED11 and EEPFA12  
Policy Scenario 
An activity specific artificial (hypothetical) carbon tax is imposed on emitting agents of 
Ethiopia to reach the emission reduction target of -64% with respect to the baseline. With 
Carbon tax being imposed in all scenarios, the simulations mentioned hereunder are 
distinguished based on the proportion of carbon tax revenue allocation between government 
and households and the associated productivity gains in the health and education sectors. 
                                                 
9 We assumed a 5% emission efficiency improvement per year in those sectors whose emissions were output  
linked which is consistent with the historical average growth rate of agricultural emission efficiency (mainly 
methane) (World Bank Data for Ethiopia from 1971 to 2010) (WorldBank). Assuming this rate of emission 
efficiency improvement could be sustained can be justified as the CRGE strategy has outlined initiatives aimed 
to increase the productivity of farmland and livestock without increasing the cultivated area or cattle headcount. 
Such initiatives include intensifying agriculture through usage of improved inputs and better residue 
management, introducing lower-emission agricultural techniques, ranging from the use of carbon-and nitrogen 
efficient crop cultivars to the promotion of organic fertilizers, increasing animal value chain efficiency to 
improve productivity, i.e., output per head of cattle via higher production per animal and an increased off-take 
rate, led by better health and marketing, supporting consumption of lower-emitting sources of protein, e.g., 
poultry-an increase of the share of meat consumption from poultry is believed to help reduce emissions from 
domestic animals, afforestation/reforestation etc (FDRE, 2015). 
 
10 Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia 
11 Ministry of Finance and Economic development 
12 Environmental Economics Policy Forum for Ethiopia 
Variable Name Initial value in 2010  
GDP at factor cost (Billions of Birr) 354.95 
Population (millions) 76.66 
Emissions (MtCO2e) 
                                 Input Based 
174.55 
34.16 
                                Output Based 140.39 
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Specifically, four simulations are introduced with a linearly increasing carbon tax starting at 
around 3 USD (40 Birr). 
Simulation 1- Government Spending Scenario:  This simulation is meant to represent a 
situation where the government uses the revenues to support government expenditure, 
namely: investments in health, education, and public administration& defense. This 
simulation tries to mimic the government of Ethiopia’s decision to use any revenue from 
emission reduction to finance development projects (FDRE, 2011). Unfortunately, the model 
cannot analyze recycling at the project level, thus we approximate this conveying resources to 
government consumption. 
Simulation 2-Compensation Scenario:  In this simulation 50% of the carbon tax revenue is 
recycled in the form of lump sum transfers to households as compensation and 50% to 
government consumption. This simulation tests effects in supporting more of the urban poor 
than the rural poor. 
Simulation 3-Government spending and productivity scenario:  In this simulation, 
positive impacts on total factor productivity are combined with government spending 
scenario. That is, the impact of carbon tax revenue that was fully allotted for government 
spending on productivity of education and health sectors are considered in this simulation. 
This accounts for the potential benefits stemming from public spending on health and 
education. More specifically we impose a 0.063% total factor productivity increase with a 
year lag per 1% increase in health care spending and a 0.103% total factor productivity 
increase with four years lag per 1% increase in education spending. These figures are derived 
from Biswajit Maitra and C.K. Mukhopadhyay (2012) examining the growth potential of 
education and health care investment in Nepal. This has been chosen as Nepal, among the 
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very few developing countries object of such studies, is also somewhat comparable to 
Ethiopia. In both countries the vast majority of the population is dependent on agriculture; 
more than a quarter of the population falls below the poverty line; there is comparable per 
capita GDP, there are more or less similar health and education per capita expenditure, there 
is almost the same human capital ranking (Countryeconomy.com, 2018).  
Simulation 4-Compensation and productivity Scenario: Here, the second simulation is 
combined with productivity gains from the additional government spending on the health and 
education sectors. That is, government spending induced productivity gains stemmed from 
half of the carbon tax revenue allocated for government is accounted. Hence, the productivity 
gains here are less than those in the third simulation since there is less (only 50% of the 
carbon tax revenue) to be invested by the government.  
2.3.2. Analysis of Results 
 
In this section, the results of the simulations are analyzed with respect to the impacts of the 
emission reduction policy under the four simulations on selected macroeconomic variables, 
household income, sectoral allocation of production, and sectoral emission levels. 
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2.3.2.1 Effects on Selected Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Table 2.2 Effects of simulations on selected real macroeconomic variables- all figures except initial values in 2010 represent percentage changes 
from the baseline.  
Source: Own Computations 
 
Variable 
Name 
Initial 
value in 
2010 
(billions 
of Birr) 
          (2) 
Government 
spending 
scenario- 
average over 
(2011-2030) 
 
(3) 
Government 
spending 
scenario-  in 
2030 
 
       (4) 
Compensation 
scenario- 
average over 
(2011-2030) 
 
           (5) 
Compensation 
- in 2030 
 
          (6) 
Government 
spending and 
productivity   
scenario - 
average over 
(2011-2030) 
 
           (7) 
Government 
spending and 
productivity   
scenario- in 2030 
 
       (8) 
Compensation and 
productivity scenario 
- average over (2011-
2030) 
           (9) 
Compensation and 
productivity 
scenario- in 2030 
 
GDP at 
factor cost 
354.95 -1.15 -5.44   -0.85   -5.00 -0.31 -2.80 -0.44 -3.42 
Absorption 452.77 -1.12 -5.35 -0.81   -4.61 -0.41 -3.64 -0.53 -4.21 
Overall 
Household 
Expenditure 
338.61  -4.29  -11.23 -2.83 -8.22 -3.74 -9.38 -2.54 -7.45 
Exports 51.87 0.14 -1.32 0.78 1.42 1.06 1.63 1.48 1.79 
Exchange 
Rate 
    1 7.86 26.38 8.43 29.48 9.29 31.90 9.35 32.73 
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As it is evident from Table 2.2, the effect of the carbon tax policy on real economic variables 
is negative (the full dynamic picture of the policy effects is provided by figures 1 to 4). The 
effect becomes more pronounced in later periods as the magnitude of tax increases. Ranking 
the simulations, the best (less negative) outcomes are obtained when revenues are recycled in 
the form of 100% support to public spending, accounting for the positive effect of investment 
in health care and education (GDP loss of 2.80% compared to baseline in 2030), followed by 
50% recycling to government expenditure and 50% recycled lump sum to households (GDP 
loss of 3.42% compared to baseline in 2030). 
The only variables showing some improvement are exports, which might be associated with 
the depreciation of domestic currency as reflected by the exchange rate. Nonetheless, in the 
first simulation, the effect on export becomes negative in later periods.   
An interesting insight from the results is that, without accounting for government spending 
induced productivity gains, rebating tax revenues to households would be less penalizing 
economically than allocating it to government expenditure (comparison of the first two 
simulations). 
This comparison emphasizes just distributional effects induced by the two types of 
expenditures, governmental and household. It appears thus that real GDP would decrease by 
5% in compensation scenario as opposed to 5.44% in government spending scenario (in 2030) 
and absorption decreases by 4.61% in compensation scenario as opposed to 5.35% in 
government spending scenario (in 2030). 
The situation reverses when government spending productivity gains are accounted for 
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(comparison of the last two simulations).13 
Anyway all the simulations point out the potential high economic cost of the policy and stress 
the need for (a) international support to Ethiopia for the implementation of the mitigation 
policy and (b) a careful design of the use of the tax revenues. A simple expansion of 
government expenditure is not sufficient to trigger those positive multiplicative effects on the 
economy to overcome the policy costs especially in the longer term. In general, an earn-
marking of revenues to selected growth enhancing projects or strategies and human capital 
investment is essential.  
We are aware that the CGE model employed here doesn’t fully capture the characteristics of 
the Ethiopian economy. More importantly, the structural rigidities and disequilibrium in the 
labor market are not accounted for. However, as a first attempt in Ethiopia, the results here 
give insight on the economic cost of the INDC policy and the possible recycling of the policy 
to reduce the costs. Indeed IFPRI has developed the CGE model to be applied in developing 
country context reflecting some of the basic characteristics such as household consumption of 
non-traded (home) goods and transaction costs. 
                                                 
13 We are however aware that either our assumptions on the pro-growth nature of public spending in Ethiopia is 
highly speculative or that the assumption of a null pro-growth effect of private consumption is quite extreme. 
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          Figure 2.1 GDP trend 
                     
 
  Figure 2.2 Absorption trend 
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                   Figure 2.3 Household Expenditure trend 
       
       
 
Figure 2.4 Export trend 
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2.3.2. 2. Effects on Sectoral value added 
Turning to sectoral effects, value added shows considerable reduction compared to the baseline 
everywhere with the partial exception of services, with more pronounced adverse effects in 
2030 (Table 2.3). Agriculture is the most adversely affected sector being also the major 
contributor to Ethiopian emissions. Its value added on average decreases by 6%, 5.08%, 5.54% 
and 4.65% under the government spending, compensation, government spending with 
productivity gain, and compensation with productivity gain scenarios  respectively.  
The sectoral picture highlights an interesting feedback mechanism: the productivity increase of 
education and health expenditure also increases production and, to some extent, emissions. The 
emission reduction target is fixed though and thus it also becomes harder to achieve. This 
additional burden falls for its major part on agriculture, and in particular on the livestock sector 
that, alone, builds more than 40% of the total country emission. Accordingly, for agriculture, it 
turns out that a carbon tax revenue rebate to households is preferable than expansion of 
government expenditure even when the associated productivity gains are accounted for. Exactly 
the opposite occurs for industry and services. Services in particular are positively affected by 
the tax policy that induces a re-allocation of the economic activity towards that low-emitting 
sector, and this shift is strengthened in the government spending and productivity scenario that 
also features higher emission reduction costs. 
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Table 2.3: Effects on Sectoral value added- all figures except initial values in 2010 represent percentage changes from the baseline. 
Sector 
Name 
Initial 
value 
in 
2010 
(billio
ns of 
Birr) 
          (2) 
Government 
spending 
scenario- 
average over 
(2011-2030) 
 
(3) 
Government 
spending 
scenario-  in 
2030 
 
       (4) 
Compensation 
scenario- average 
over (2011-2030) 
 
           (5) 
Compensation   
scenario  - in 
2030 
 
          (6) 
Government spending 
and productivity   
scenario - average 
over (2011-2030) 
 
           (7) 
Government 
spending and 
productivity   
scenario- in 
2030 
 
       (8) 
Compensation 
and 
productivity 
scenario - 
average over 
(2011-2030 
           (9) 
Compensation 
and 
productivity 
scenario- in 
2030 
 
Agriculture 174.26 -6.00 -18.50 -5.08 -16.12 -5.54 -17.01 -4.65 -15.31 
Livestock  48.77 -6.01 -19.02 -5.66 -17.15 -5.87 -18.45 -5.42 -16.23 
    Other 
Agricul.        
125.49 -5.96 -16.62 -4.88 -16.01 -4.72 -16.22 -4.41 -15.77 
   Industry 36.19 -2.07 -6.92 -1.29 -5.32 -0.36 -1.62 -0.43 -1.88 
    Service 144.49 0.43 -1.84 0.88 -1.21 2.96 4.15 1.91 2.93 
 
Overall 354.95 -1.15 -5.44 
 
-0.85 
 
-5.00 
 
-0.31 
 
-2.98 
 
-0.44 
 
-3.52 
Source: Own computation 
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2.3.2.3. Effects on household income  
In the simulations, the performance of household income follows, not surprisingly, that of 
GDP.  More interesting is the study of policy effects on different household groups. In the 
government spending scenario (carbon tax without compensation and productivity), the policy 
demonstrates regressive effects. More precisely, the rural poor are affected relatively more due 
to the fact that they are more dependent on the largest emitter sector-agriculture (anyway in 
Ethiopia more than 80% of the population relies on the sector) either in term of income 
sources or in consumption, considering they, in general spend, a larger proportion of their 
income on agricultural commodities compared to the non-poor. 
 The compensation plan (second simulation), significantly reduces the negative impact of the 
carbon tax on households in general and the poor in particular. The urban poor became even 
better off under the compensation plan than under the baseline scenario.  This is not only due 
to the fact the urban population is less affected by the policy than the rural population (are 
more connected to agricultural activities), but also because the transfer scheme tends to 
replicate the existing transfer allocation that favors urban poor (the government’s tradition, as 
reflected also in the SAM, is to make more transfer to the urban than the rural population). 
Third simulation is less pro-poor than the second one which shows that government spending 
productivity gains are more beneficial to the non-poor population.  
 
 
 
 34 | P a g e  
 
 
Table 2.4: Effects on household- all figures except initial values in 2010 represent percentage changes from the baseline. 
Variable 
Name 
Initial 
value in 
2010 
(billions 
of Birr) 
          (2) 
Government 
spending 
scenario- 
average over 
(2011-2030) 
 
(3) 
Government 
spending 
scenario-  in 
2030 
 
       (4) 
Compensation 
scenario- 
average over 
(2011-2030) 
 
           (5) 
Compensation 
scenario– in 
2030 
 
          (6) 
Government 
spending and 
productivity   
scenario - 
average over 
(2011-2030) 
 
           (7) 
Government 
spending and 
productivity   
scenario- in 
2030 
 
       (8) 
Compensation 
and productivity 
scenario - 
average over 
(2011-2030 
           (9) 
Compensation 
and 
productivity 
scenario- in 
2030 
 
Household 
income 
360.37 -2.88 -9.02 -1.61 -5.57 -2.06 -7.53 -1.47 -4.31 
     Rural Poor 67.55 -8.14 -25.84 -2.66 -3.85 -7.65 -24.79 -2.32 -3.75 
     Rural  non-  
         poor 205.47 
 
-2.85 -8.30 -2.47 
 
-6.52 
 
-2.07 
 
-6.12 
 
-2.01 
 
-5.96 
     Urban Poor 10.76 -0.36 -1.71 5.74 14.25 1.07 4.80 6.20 15.10 
    
  Urban non-poor 76.59 -0.32 -0.45 -0.28 -0.41 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.38 
 
-0.22 
 
-0.37 
Source: Own Computations 
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2.3.2.4. Effects on Sectoral Emissions 
The overall emission reduction is fixed for the Ethiopian economy and is minus 64% compared 
to the baseline in 2030. Agriculture, the major contributor to emissions is also the major 
contributor in abatement (-42.97% on yearly average peaking to -73.03% in 2030 compared to 
the baseline). Industrial, emissions decline annually, on average by 26.56% relative to the 
baseline. Emissions of the service sector follow the re-composition of the overall economic 
activity showing the lowest decline, especially in the initial simulation years. 
 Although the sectoral distribution of emission abatement does not change significantly across 
simulations, it is interesting to note that abatement in agriculture is a bit higher in simulation 3 
than in simulation 1, showing the effect of productivity and production increase due to public 
spending. Similarly, when revenues are rebated to households, it is that part of the economy that 
expands and emits more and is eventually required for a higher mitigation effort (-62.30% 
compared to baseline in 2030 of compensation and productivity scenario vs the -58.65% of 
compensation scenario). 
 Table 2.5 below shows the effect of the policy on sectoral emissions. 
Next, the full dynamic path of the policy effects on sectoral emissions is also provided by the 
figures 5-11 
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Table 2.5: effects on sectoral emission- all figures except initial values in 2010 represent percentage changes from the baseline. 
Sector Name Initial 
value in 
2010 
(millions 
of CO2e) 
          (2) 
Government 
spending 
scenario- 
average over 
(2011-2030) 
 
(3) 
Government 
spending 
scenario-  in 
2030 
 
       (4) 
Compensation 
scenario- 
average over 
(2011-2030) 
 
           (5) 
Compensation 
scenario– in 
2030 
 
          (6) 
Government 
spending and 
productivity   
scenario - 
average over 
(2011-2030) 
 
           (7) 
Government 
spending and 
productivity   
scenario- in 
2030 
 
       (8) 
Compensation 
and 
productivity 
scenario - 
average over 
(2011-2030 
           (9) 
Compensation 
and 
productivity 
scenario- in 
2030 
 
All Production Activities       130.32 -38.41 -64.74 -39.25 -65.91 -38.20 -65.27 -38.35 -64.93 
Agriculture       106.62 -42.97 -73.03 -43.76 -73.93 -42.99 -73.22 -42.62 -72.68 
Livestock          65.00 -44.97 -76.25 -45.93 -76.84 -45.27 -76.97 -45.99 -76.31 
Other Agriculture       41.62 -40.51 -69.53 -39.93 -69.12 -40.30 -69.64 -39.69 -68.74 
 
   Industry      15.92 
           
 -26.56 
                                                                       
-45.42 
    
  -26.03 
                                                 
-45.27 -25.61 -44.89 
 
-25.58 
 
-44.18 
 Service      7.78 -20.97 -43.24 -22.04 -45.67 -22.35 -45.88 -21.71 -44.72 
Households 
    44.23 
 
-32.93 -61.75 
 
-30.63 -58.65 
 
-33.49 
 
-63.17 
 
-33.22 
 
-62.30 
 
Overall  174.55 -36.84 -64.00 -36.78 -64.00 
 
-36.86 
 
-64.00 
 
-36.67 
 
64.00 
Price of emission/tone of 
CO2e in 2030 (in Birr) 
  2904  3329 
  
 
3278 
  
 
3283 
Source: Own Computations 
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Figure 2.5 Trend of activity emission  
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Trend of agricultural emission  
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Figure 2.7 Trend of livestock emission  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Trend of industrial emission  
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Figure 2.9 Trend of service emission  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Trend of household emission  
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Figure 2.11 Trend of overall emission  
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 2.4. Conclusion and Implications 
Ethiopia has the objective of achieving a lower middle-income country status in a carbon neutral 
trajectory by 2025. To sustain the recently recorded fast and non-oil based economy, the country has 
launched the CRGE strategy as part of the overall development plan to reduce future emissions. 
Moreover, it submitted its own INDCs to the UNCCC secretariat to reaffirm its determination in 
fighting climate change where it sets an emission reduction target of 64% in 2030 compared to the 
BAU scenario. Against this background, this paper investigated the economic and environmental 
implications of a carbon tax implemented in Ethiopia to achieve the country’s INDC. It uses a 
recursive-dynamic CGE model calibrated on the updated Ethiopian 2009/10 SAM and the 
corresponding emission data. 
Four simulation experiments have been conducted. In the first simulation, carbon tax revenue has been 
allocated entirely for government consumption, whereas in the second simulation, the carbon tax 
revenue has been equally divided between government consumption and lump sum transfer to 
households. In the third simulation, government expenditure induced productivity gain in the health and 
educations sectors is combined with the first simulation. In the fourth simulation, government 
expenditure induced productivity gain in the health and educations sectors is combined with the second 
simulation. The results of simulation experiments indicate that GDP, national absorption and household 
consumption are adversely affected relative to the baseline scenario, the impact being higher in the first 
simulation. The third simulation works best to minimize the incidence of INDC policy on GDP and 
absorption which implies that if government expenditures are productive as assumed, using the carbon 
tax revenue for government consumption is more productive in terms of GDP than compensation to 
households.    
The effect on household income is particularly negative especially under the government spending 
scenario (first simulation) and least affected under the compensation scheme (second simulation). As it 
is evident from the sectoral break down of the results, agriculture, and within agriculture, livestock, 
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which are the largest emitting sector, are also those bearing the higher costs of the policy in terms of 
value added contraction. This boils down into a particularly regressive effect of the policy that hits 
relatively more adversely rural poor with a stronger dependence on agriculture. 
All this highlights the potential high economic cost of the policy and stresses the need for (a) 
international support to Ethiopia for the implementation of the mitigation policy and (b) a careful 
design of the use of the tax revenues. Using the carbon tax revenue for simple expansion of government 
expenditure is not adequately enough to produce positive multiplicative effects on the economy unless 
productivity gains are observed.  Without productivity gains, direct support to households seems, for 
instance, a better option, especially to contrast the clear regressivity of the carbon tax. However, when 
the carbon tax revenue allocated for government spending brings human capita productivity 
improvements, expansion of government expenditure seems better counterbalance the negative effects 
of the INDC policy on GDP. In general, an earn-marking of revenues to selected growth enhancing 
projects or strategies is essential. It can be also particularly appropriate to invest in clean technologies 
that are meant to improve emission efficiency in agriculture as most of the emissions emanate from that 
sector. 
As a concluding remark, it is important to stress that the analysis presented does not consider the co-
benefits benefits from emission reduction. These, be they direct or ancillary can be relevant.  
As this study is the first attempt in Ethiopia, it leaves a wide room for future research potential. Firstly, 
the relative merits of alternative mitigation policies in attaining the INDC plan would be worth to 
study. Secondly, developing a multi-country CGE model or linking the current model with a multi-
country model like GTAP would help deal with the changing situation in the rest of world. Thirdly, an 
examination of various tax revenue recycling policies would be of great interest. Fourthly, the 
introduction of unemployment and endogenous labour supply would contribute for the improvement of 
the model.  Lastly, quantification of co-benefits of reduced emissions would be of great importance.  
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Chapter 3 
The Poverty, Distributional and Welfare Implications of INDC Policies for 
Ethiopia 
Abstract 
 
Environmental policies relying on market-based instruments, primarily carbon taxes, are becoming more 
advocated to mitigate the ever increasing GHG emissions, due to their efficiency properties. However the 
equity implications of such policies, the impacts on poverty, on wealth distribution, and on the prospects for 
growth are equally important.  This is particularly true for developing countries whose primary aim is to 
improve upon weak economic and social performances.  
 
Ethiopia submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) to the UNFCCC secretariat 
with an emission reduction goal of 64% in 2030 compared to the BAU scenario. At the same time, the 
country is committed to reducing poverty and attaining its middle income status by 2025.  As such, this study 
aims at analyzing the poverty, distributional and welfare consequences the implementation of Ethiopia’s 
INDC policy in the form of carbon tax.  To this end, the results from percentage changes in household 
consumption expenditure from the CGE model are linked to the 2010/11Ethiopian household expenditure 
and consumption survey micro data which covers 27,835 households (CSA 2011). 
 
In accordance with the CGE simulations four scenarios have been considered. The first represents the 
implementation of a carbon tax where the revenues are entirely absorbed by government expenditure.  The 
second represents the implementation of the carbon tax with lump sum transfer of 50% of the tax revenue to 
households. The third and fourth simulations add government expenditure induced productivity gains (in 
education and health) to the first and second simulations respectively. We found that INDC policy for 
Ethiopia would be costly to households under the first and third simulations. With the second and fourth 
simulations, we found sensible results whereby an improvement in poverty; inequality and welfare have been 
observed. The urban poor have benefited more from both the compensation plan and productivity gains than 
the rural non-poor. More importantly, compensation to households is more equitable than allocating the 
carbon tax revenue for government expenditure. 
 
The results suggest that compensation of carbon tax revenue transfers should be structured such that the 
rural poor are more beneficiary as they are much larger in number and they are more affected by the carbon 
tax policy. Lastly, a huge international support is required to help the country achieve its emission reduction 
target at modest Poverty, welfare and distributional costs. 
 
Keywords: Emission, carbon tax, poverty, inequality, welfare, Simulation, base, expenditure, Ethiopia 
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3.1. Background and Motivation 
 
There is growing evidence that climate change is one of the planetary challenges our societies have 
to face in the next future (IPCCb, 2007). Its mitigation is an unavoidable discussion item in policy 
making agendas not only in countries that are increasingly integrating it into national development 
policies and plans, but also in those countries resisting committing against it. Developing countries 
joined the international community in reducing emissions since the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) initially adhering to the principle of 
common, but differentiated responsibilities.  Indeed, within the context of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 
the first, and at the moment only, internationally binding emission reduction treaty, developing 
nations were not imposed binding emission reduction limits rather were given opportunity to get 
climate finance in exchange for their voluntary efforts to reduce emissions. A turning point in 
international climate negotiations is, however, the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, corresponding to 
the 21st international negotiation round on climate policies. There, many developing countries, 
including Ethiopia, finally submitted their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) to the 
UNFCCC secretariat setting specific, albeit voluntary, mitigation and adaptation targets. Ethiopia 
proposes the ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction goal of 64% in 2030 compared to the 
BAU scenario (FDRE, 2015; UNFCCC, 2015).  
As environmental concerns are receiving widespread attention, environmental policies relying on 
market-based instruments, primarily carbon taxes, are becoming more advocated, due to their 
efficiency properties (Baranzini, Goldemberg, & Speck, 2000; Barker & Johnstone, 1998; Shah & 
Larsen, 1992). However the equity implications of such policies, the impacts on poverty, on wealth 
distribution, and on the prospects for growth are equally important.  This is particularly true for 
developing countries whose primary aim is to improve upon weak economic and social 
performances. Indeed, these concerns are among the typical motivations inducing countries to 
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hesitate adopting emission reduction policies implemented through carbon taxes and a major 
obstacle to the smooth development of international climate change negotiations (Shah & Larsen, 
1992; Ved & Javier, 1998; Yusuf & Resosudarmo, 2015). 
The available empirical literature on the distributional implications of carbon taxes is quite ample, 
but concentrated mostly on developed countries (see for example: (Baranzini, Goldemberg, & 
Speck, 2000; Callan, Lyons, Scott, Tol, & Verde, 2009; Cornwell & Creedy, 1996; Flues & 
Thomas, 2015; Hamilton & Cameron, 1994; Jorgenson, Slesnick, Wilcoxen, Joskow, & Kopp, 
1992; Klinge, Birr-Pedersen, & Wier, 2003; Leach, 2009; Poterba, 1991; Symons, Proops, & Gay, 
1994); (Tiezzi, 2005; Wier, Birr-Pedersen, Jacobsen, & Klok, 2005)). It is suggested that carbon 
taxes have proved to be mostly regressive, i.e. their cost is borne more by lower rather than higher 
income households. However, distributional outcomes are found to depend on the mode for 
recycling carbon tax revenues, for example, whether revenues go to the government or to 
households (Bureau, 2011; Callan, Lyons, Scott, Tol, & Verde, 2009; Keohane, Revesz, & Stavins, 
1997). Nonetheless, such analyses are extremely limited in developing countries. There is in fact 
some literature analyzing the potential consequences of removing fossil fuel subsidies in developing 
countries which can be viewed with some affinity to the introduction of carbon/energy taxes. In this 
vein, (Durand-Lasserve, Campagnolo, Chateau, & Dellink, 2015) noted that if  Indonesia  were  to  
remove  fossil fuel  subsidies, it  would  record  real  GDP and welfare gains. At the same time they 
underline again the importance of properly designed compensating schemes for households that 
could turn potential welfare losses into gains. Recycling in the form of Cash transfers is found to 
make the reform more attractive for poorer households and reduce poverty. Eventually, it is the re-
distribution scheme that matters in determining the overall distributional effect of such reforms. 
Indonesia is also one of the few developing countries where the distributional implication of a 
carbon tax has been explicitly studied. Yusuf & Resosudarmo (2015), using a static Computable 
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General Equilibrium (CGE) model investigated the effects of introducing a carbon tax aiming to 
achieve a 6% emission reduction compared to the business as usual scenario in 2004.The results 
suggest that, unlike most studies on developed countries, the distributional effects in Indonesia are 
not necessarily regressive. This outcome is determined by both the income and the expenditure 
patterns of households where the resource reallocation due to the introduction of a carbon tax is in 
favour of factors endowed more proportionally by rural, and lower income class households 
Indeed already at the beginning of the 1990s, Shah & Larsen (1992) pointed to many peculiar 
characteristics of developing countries such as agricultural dominance, industrial characteristics and 
household expenditure patterns which naturally differ from that in rich countries  
that could determine different results from these policies.  
Against this background, it would be interesting and relevant to test whether a similar conclusion 
could be drawn with reference to Ethiopia. Its economic structure is highly representative of a 
developing tropical country. With a GDP per capita of around USD 380 as of 2010, Ethiopia is still 
one of Africa's poorest countries. With only 17% of the Ethiopia’s population living in urban 
centres and nearly half of them live in the capital, Addis Ababa, more than 80% of employment is 
still concentrated in agriculture. Agriculture is also the major source of emission with the livestock 
sector alone accounting for more than 40% of the total emission (FDRE, 2015). In addition to 
setting an ambitious emission reduction plan, the Ethiopia government, puts at the same time 
poverty reduction and economic growth at the top of priority. 
This chapter is intended to assess the potential distributional implications for Ethiopia of pursuing 
the emission reduction target part of its NDCs, implemented through a carbon tax. The study 
couples the results from a recursive-dynamic CGE analysis investigating the economic implication 
of Ethiopia’s INDCs (chapter 2) with micro data from Ethiopian household survey (CSA, 2011). 
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The CGE analysis, that considers explicitly 4 household types, i.e. urban rich and poor, rural rich 
and poor, already emphasized that the mitigation policy can be regressive, as the costs are borne 
mostly by the poorer rural population being emissions primarily originated by the agricultural 
sector, especially livestock. At the same time, it stressed that an important role to reduce costs and 
regressive impacts is played by the use of the revenues from the carbon tax.  
Starting from these results, exploiting the much richer household stratification provided by 
Ethiopian household survey, the objective of this work is to expand chapter 2 to provide a 
quantitative estimate of the effects of Ethiopia’s mitigation NDCs implemented with a carbon tax 
on: 
 Poverty 
 Inequality 
 Welfare. 
In what follows, section 2 introduces the methodology, section 3 summarizes the results and section 
4 wraps up the study with the conclusion and implications.  
3.2. Methodology 
3.2.1. Database and Linkages 
In chapter two of this thesis,  we developed an extended version of the core CGE model structure 
used by the International Food Policy Research Institute (Lofgren, Harris, & Robinson, 2002), 
calibrating it on the Ethiopian data for 2009/10 and adding a CO2 emission and carbon tax module. 
The model was then applied to investigate the macroeconomic impacts on Ethiopia of  introducing a 
carbon tax enabling the country to achieve a 64% emission reduction target compared to the 
Business as Usual scenario in 2030 as set out in the INDC of the country. To recall, four policy 
scenarios were considered, all which imposed 64% emission reduction in 2030: 
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Simulation 1-Government spending scenario: carbon tax scenario where government collects all 
the carbon tax revenues and uses them for its consumption. This complies with the Ethiopian 
government plan intending to use finances gained from any climate change intervention policy to 
support big nation-wide development projects (FDRE, 2011). 
Simulation 2- Compensation scenario: 50% of the carbon tax revenue is recycled in the form of 
lump sum transfers to poor households and the remaining part continues to be used for government 
expenditure. 
Simulation 3- Government spending and productivity scenario:  The first simulation plus 
Productivity effects of the carbon tax revenue used for government expenditure. For this, the impact 
of 1% increase in education and health expenditures from the study for Nepal’s economy, an 
economy with similar characteristics with the Ethiopian economy, is adopted (please see chapter 2 
for more details). 
Simulation 4- Compensation and productivity scenario: The second Simulation plus 
productivity effects of the carbon tax revenue used for government expenditure in that simulation. 
The mechanism is the same as the third simulation except here only 50% of the carbon tax revenue 
is spent for government consumption.   
Table 3.1 summarizes major results from chapter 2. Those more relevant for this chapter refer to 
household consumption expenditure. In spite of being aware of the huge approximation with it, we 
use the yearly average percentage changes over 20 years from the CGE model and apply them to 
the 2010/11 survey data.  
We understand that there would be a huge approximation associated with imposing a 20 years 
average percentage changes on 2010/11 survey data to study the distributional impact of the policy. 
However, the effect of the policy in 2011 is almost null, and that in 2030, extremely high. So we 
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deem anyway useful to try to provide the average figure. This is preferred to use the 2011 impacts 
from the CGE model as they are negligible, at the same time, using the 2030 result could 
overestimate the distributional costs of the policy. On the other hand it would be quite easy to 
introduce alternative evolution of the household expenditure structure along time; however this 
would introduce a further element of subjectivity that we prefer to avoid. 
Table 3.1: Effects of simulations on GDP, absorption, Household consumption expenditure:  
Simulation growth (% change) relative to the baseline- average over (2011-2030) 
 
Variable Name 
Initial 
value in 
2010 
(billions of 
Birr) 
Government 
spending 
scenario 
Compensation 
Scenario 
Government 
spending and 
productivity 
scenario 
Compensation 
and 
productivity 
scenario 
GDP at factor cost 354.95 -1.15 -0.85 -0.31 -0.44 
Absorption 452.77 -1.12 -0.81 -0.41 -0.53 
Overall Household 
Expenditure 
338.61  -4.29  -2.83 -3.74 -2.54 
Rural poor 63.64  -8.13  -1.92  -7.01 -1.28 
Rural non- 
poor 197.25  -3.56  
-3.45 -2.98 -2.59 
Urban Poor 9.97   -1.60   4.70  0.78 5.81 
Urban non-
poor 67.76  -1.26  -1.13  
-0.99 -0.74 
Rural total 260.89  -5.07  -3.25 -3.93 -2.14 
Urban total 77.73  -1.31   0.40  -0.36 0.59 
* In 2011, one Euro corresponded to 24.5 Birr 
Source: Own computations from CGE model 
 
 
The last four columns of table 3.1, show that GDP, Absorption and household consumption 
expenditure would decrease. On average, over the period 2011- 2030, the household consumption 
declines by 4.29%, 2.83%, 3.74% and 2.54% respectively under the first, second, third and fourth 
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simulations respectively. Without support to low income households, the policy is acutely 
regressive especially in rural area, bearing the higher cost in terms of consumption contraction. 
This outcome is driven either by the still high emission share of the agricultural sector in the 
country, or by the traditionally higher dependence of poor rural communities on that sector. 
Interestingly, in urban area, where the direct dependence on agriculture is lower, poor and non-
poor households experience much similar percent consumption losses under government spending 
scenario. As expected, the tax revenue rebate on poor households reverts the picture with urban 
poor even increasing their consumption levels. This may suggest an even more targeted recycling 
scheme with a stronger facilitation to rural poor. On top of this, poor households benefit more from 
direct transfers than the productivity gains from government expenditure in the education and 
health sectors. On the other hand, the results under government spending with productivity and 
compensation with productivity scenarios suggest that non-poor households benefit more from 
productivity gains than from direct transfers.   
The percentage changes in household consumption expenditure from the CGE model are then 
linked to the 2010/11Ethiopian household expenditure and consumption survey (CSA 2011).This 
multiple household micro dataset covers 27,835 households among which 10,322 rural and 17,513 
urban. In this top-down sequential approach (see Figure 2.1) the CGE model outcomes are mapped 
to the Ethiopian micro data. 
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Figure 2.1: The top-down sequential approach. 
Adapted from Aredo, Fekadu, & Workneh (2007); Colombo (2008) 
The mapping procedure is the following (see also (Aredo, Fekadu, & Workneh, 2007; Colombo, 
2008)) for similar methodology).  
As a first step we identify the number of rural and urban poor and non-poor in the household survey 
data using the expenditure shares from the CGE. For instance, the share of consumption accounted 
by the total poor is 21.74% in the CGE data matrix. Accordingly, after ranking households in 
descending expenditure order in the household survey, those contributing to the bottom 21.74% are 
considered poor. Sampling weights are duly considered to compute the cumulative household 
expenditure which is used to demarcate the number of poor households that correspond to their 
appropriate share to total expenditure in the country. This also allows identifying the poverty line 
corresponding to the consumption expenditure level of the richest household within the 21.74%. 
This poverty line is used to identify both the urban and rural poor. The same procedure was then 
applied to identify all the four types of households as the survey also reports urban and rural origin. 
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In the next step, by applying to the household survey data the percentage changes in consumption 
expenditure of each of the household categories from the CGE model, it is then possible to compute 
how many households are crossing that poverty line in either directions. 
This is our starting point to compute policy impacts on poverty, inequality and welfare. 
3.2.2. Measuring impacts on poverty 
The policy impact on poverty is measured by three different poverty indexes as defined by (Foster, 
Greer, & Thorbecke, 1984). 
The general class of the Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT thereafter) indexes is the following. 
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 
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)()( ……………………………………………………………(1) 
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The last term in equation (1) is an indicator function with 1iI it zyi  and 0iI otherwise. The 
exponent  is a poverty aversion parameter. The larger  is, the greater the degree of poverty 
aversion (or, said differently, the sensitivity to large poverty gaps). 
Three poverty measures can be drawn from equation (1) depending on the values of . 
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Where q represents the number of poor people and N  is the total population. It gives the proportion 
of the population whose incomes fall below the poverty line thereby measuring the prevalence 
(incidence) of poverty. The principal advantage of this index is that it is easy to construct and 
interpret. However, it does not show the “extent” to which the poor fall below the poverty line; 
hence it does not change if people below the poverty line become poorer. 
The Average Normalized poverty Gap [FGT(1)]: This is the case when .1  
  i
n
i
ii IzyzfFGT 


1
)()1( ……………………………………………………………………..(3) 
This measure captures the acuteness (depth) of poverty as it measures the total shortfall of the poor 
from the poverty line. It also signals the cost of eliminating that poverty. This measure has the 
drawback that it does not consider the importance of the number of people who are below the 
poverty line. The measure does not reflect changes in inequality among the poor. 
The Average Squared Normalized poverty Gap [FGT(2)]: This is the case when .2  
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ii IzyzfFGT
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)()2( 

 ……………………………………………………………………(4) 
This measure of poverty takes into account not only the poverty gap but also the intra-poor 
inequality since the poor also have differences in status. By squaring the poverty gap, this measure 
implicitly puts more weight on observations that fall farther below the poverty line. 
3.2.3. Measuring impacts on inequality 
Distributional impacts of the policy are summarized by the Gini coefficient a widespread measure 
of inequality of a distribution. Developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini and published in 
(1912) in his paper "Variabilità e mutabilità" ("Variability and Mutability"), it ranges, by 
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construction, between 0 and 1. 0 corresponds to perfect income equality (i.e. everyone has the same 
income) and 1 corresponds to perfect income inequality (i.e. one person has all the income, while 
everyone else has zero income).  
There are slightly different versions of the Gini index (G). That used here is: 

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
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


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n
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mN
NG
1
2
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2
)/1(1 ……………………………………………………..(5) 
The notation is as before. Persons are ranked in ascending order of iy and m  is the arithmetic mean 
expenditure. 
3.2.4. Measuring impact on Social Welfare 
There is a huge debate on measuring social welfare, starting from the intrinsic difficulty to define 
welfare itself (Atkinson, 1983; Jenkins, 1997; Jorgenson, Slesnick, Wilcoxen, Joskow, & Kopp, 
1992; Stiglitz & Fitoussi, 2009). A possible  procedure, once a given welfare source/indicator like 
income or consumption has been defined, is to apply so-called social welfare functions (SWFs) to 
measure the welfare embodied in a given allocation of those sources within a population. SWFs are 
typically dependent on both the total (or mean) values, their distribution across the members of the 
population, attitudes towards equitable distributions. At the two polar cases there are the utilitarian 
SWFs, with zero inequality aversion14, and the Rawlsian SWFs, with infinite inequality aversion15.  
Another corner-stone methodology in welfare measurement, the one followed in this research, is to 
compute the Equally Distributed Equivalent (EDE) expenditure/income. EDE expenditure/income 
is that level of expenditure/income that, if given to every individual in the population after a policy 
shock, would generate the same level of social welfare as the current distribution (Mnally, 2013). 
                                                 
14In these functions total societal welfare increases uniformly, irrespectively from whom within the society increases 
her/is income or consumption level. 
15In these functions total societal welfare increases if and only if the poorest component of the society increases her/his 
income or consumption level. 
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EDE expenditure/income is at the basis of the computation of the social welfare index by (Jenkins, 
1997), ew ,used in this work. It is defined as:  
   eedee eY
e
w



1
)(
1
1
,  1,0  ee …………………………………………………….(6) 
where e  is the inequality aversion parameter which takes a standard value equal to 0.5.Yede is the 
Equally Distributed Equivalent (EDE) Income/Expenditure. Using the previous notation, over an 
entire population, it is computed as: 
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If e were equal to 1, (6) and (7) would collapse to (8) and (9) respectively. 
 )1(log1 edeYw  1e ………………………………………………………………….(8) 
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We also compute the other commonly used welfare measure: the Sen welfare index (A. Sen, 1976). 
It is defined as: 
)1( GmS  ……………………………………………………………………………………(10) 
Where Gm and  are the mean per capita expenditure and the Gini coefficient respectively. 
Sen’s index is negatively related to the Gini coefficient and positively related to the per capita 
expenditure. As G approaches to 1, maximum inequality, S tends to zero.  
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3.3. Data Analysis and Results 
3.3.1. The starting Point: Impacts on household consumption from the CGE Analysis 
To analyze the poverty changes, we used the DAD16 distribution analysis software that allows a 
micro simulation analysis of the FGT decomposable poverty indices using 2010/11 HCE survey. As 
anticipated in the methodology section, to compute the FGT poverty indices, we used the 
percentage changes in consumption expenditure of household groups produced by the CGE 
analysis. 
3.3.2. Impacts on Poverty 
Among the 27,835 households at national level, we found that 10,322 were rural and 17,513 were 
urban17 (CSA, 2011).One point to note is that, based on the  information provided by the Central 
Statistical Agency (CSA) for 2010/11, we changed the household consumption expenditures in the 
survey into consumption expenditure per adult equivalent18 instead of taking per capita expenditure. 
The rationale for using adult equivalent comes from (Deaton & Zaidi, 2002), in their cornerstone 
work in consumption analysis.  Since children often require less expenditure than adults, it could be 
misleading to treat them like adults. Moreover, there are certain household goods that could be 
considered quasi-public goods, such as housing, that do not increase incrementally with the number 
                                                 
16The DAD (distribution analysis) software is “designed to facilitate the analysis and the comparisons of social welfare, 
inequality, poverty and equity across distributions of living standards. Its features include the estimation of a large 
number of indices and curves that are useful for distributive comparisons as well as the provision of asymptotic 
standard errors to enable statistical inference. The features also include basic descriptive statistics and provide simple 
non-parametric estimations of density functions and regressions.” (Duclos, Araar, & Fortin, 2010) 
 
17The number of urban households is larger in the survey. However, the sampling weight attached to each household is 
much larger for rural households compared to urban households. With the attached sampling weight, the total 
population of the country (less the non-sedentary populations that were excluded from the survey for practical reasons) 
is estimated to be 76.1 million people in the survey year. 
 
18The computation of adult equivalent (AE) is as follows: AE = (A + αK) θ; where A is the number of adults (>=15 
years old), K is the number of children (<15 years old), α is the cost of kids relative to adults, and θ is an estimate of the 
household economies of scale. Based on (Deaton & Zaidi, 2002), recommendations for developing economies, α=0.25, 
implying that children cost a quarter of adults on average, and θ=0.9, a low level of economies of scale given that most 
expenditures in developing economies are on private goods rather than public goods (for example, the high proportion 
of food expenditure (CSA, 2011).  
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of household members. Hence, larger households take more advantage of the economies of scale 
from these public goods. Therefore, adult equivalents accounts for demographic differences in 
household composition (the difference between the cost of children and adults) as well as consider 
economies of scale. 
Then, we took approximate levels of consumption expenditure at the demarcation line (as 
anticipated in section 2) to represent cut points for poor and non-poor households. In doing so, we 
found the poverty line to be Birr 3495 (EUR 142 in 2011), which is slightly different from the 
national poverty line (Birr 3781 or EUR 154 in 2011) as officially reported by the 2010/11 HCE 
analytical report. 
We then introduced the consumption percentage changes on the base values of the four household 
groups derived from the CGE model simulations. Table 3.2 presents the results for the three poverty 
indices. 
Table 3.2: Impacts of Ethiopia NDC on the country’s poverty indices: yearly 2011-2030 average. 
  Base* Government 
spending 
scenario’ 
Compensa
tion 
Scenario’ 
Government 
spending and 
productivity 
scenario’ 
Compensation 
and productivity 
scenario’ 
 
 
 Headcount 
Ratio 
 FGT(0) 
National  29.16  9.88  1.34 9.19  0.01 
Rural 30.03  11.46  3.57 11.13 2.59 
Urban  23.06  3.60  -8.98 -0.30 -11.88 
 
 
 Poverty depth 
 FGT(1) 
National  7.52    22.20  2.39 17.82 0.53 
Rural 7.96  25.88  5.53 22.11 3.64 
Urban  5.90  4.75  -12.70 -2.37 -15.42 
 
 
 Poverty 
severity 
 FGT(2) 
National  2.94  25.55  2.38 20.07 0.68 
Rural 3.13  29.39  6.07 24.92 4.15 
Urban  2.23  5.38  -14.80 -2.69 -17.49 
Source: Own Computation from Micro data, Notes:* percent of poor in the no-policy case; ’percentage 
change  NDCs vs no-policy 
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In the first simulation scenario, we see that national headcount ratio increases by 9.88% from the 
baseline. The effect becomes much smaller under the second simulation witnessing the 
effectiveness of the compensation scheme especially for the urban poor that demonstrate a decline 
in headcount ratio by 8.98%. 
Accounting for the productivity enhancing effect of public expenditure, does not change 
substantively the picture. This result partly captures a characteristic of rural Ethiopia that is sparsely 
populated with households living in remote areas with scarce access to education and health 
facilities thus probably with less capacity to benefit from their improvement19. However, 
government spending with productivity (simulation 3) does decrease headcount ratio in the urban 
areas, which might be related to low dependence on agriculture, and to the existence of better 
awareness, and dense settlement.  Compensation with productivity (simulation 4) almost fully 
curtails the adverse effects of the INDC policy on poverty. Hence, government expenditure induced 
productivity gains combined with the compensation plan seem successful in attaining INDC target 
with no adverse impact on poverty. The urban population becomes even better off under 
compensation with productivity (simulation 4) than the rest of the simulations. We can see from this 
that direct transfer to households need anyway to be put in place to alleviate poverty even when 
productivity gains are accounted for.  
Poverty depth and poverty severity follow the same patterns of the headcount ratio. 
What is apparent from table 3.2 is that the magnitude of the percentage changes from the base 
values of the indexes increases when we move from the headcount index to the poverty severity 
index. This is because the poverty depth and severity tend to emphasize the effects on poorer 
households. 
                                                 
19In addition, every member of the household in rural Ethiopia, starting at the early age, shoulders responsibility and 
works full time in the agricultural sector. Rural households are not willing to send children to school as there is high 
labor demand for farming 
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Concluding, pursuing Ethiopian INDCs without any compensation to households increases overall 
poverty and the number of poor. The negative effect is particularly strong on rural households as the 
burden of the policy hits especially the agricultural sector, the major emitter in Ethiopia, on which 
the rural population relies upon. 
The adverse incidence of the policy could be significantly reduced if the revenue from carbon tax is 
transferred back to households. If the rebate is undifferentiated across rural and urban population, 
the latter could be even better off with than without the mitigation policy. Our result points out a 
clear need, and room, to target the recycling mechanism toward rural poor.   
3.3.3. Effects on Inequality 
 
 Table 3.3: Impacts of Ethiopia NDC on the country’s Gini index: yearly 2011-2030 average. 
 
 GINI coefficient 
 Base* Government 
spending 
scenario’ 
Compensation 
Scenario’ 
Government 
spending and 
productivity 
scenario’ 
Compensation 
and productivity 
scenario’ 
National  0.309  2.43  -1.06 1.82 -1.11 
Rural 0.275  2.71 -1.01 2.03 -1.02 
Urban  0.370  0.26  -1.41  -0.26 -1.53 
Source: Own Computation from Micro data 
Notes:* Gini coefficient in the no-policy case; ‘per-cent change  NDCs vs no-policy 
 
In the base year, the Gini coefficient is found to about 0.31, 0.28 and 0.37 at the national, rural and 
urban levels respectively. Interestingly, inequality in the urban areas is much higher than in rural 
areas that although poorer, are also characterized by a more uniform income distribution. In the first 
simulation (government spending scenario-without compensation scheme), it is evident that 
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inequality increases from the base year values for all classes of population. The effects reversed 
with the compensation plan under the second and fourth simulations (compensation and 
compensation with productivity scenarios).  
3.3.4. Effects on Welfare 
 
Table 3.4: Impacts of Ethiopia NDC on the country’s welfare indices: yearly 2011-2030 average. 
 
   
Base* 
Governme
nt spending 
scenario’ 
Compensatio
n Scenario’ 
Government 
spending and 
productivity 
scenario’ 
Compensatio
n and 
productivity 
scenario’ 
 
 W(e) (Jenkin’s 
Social swelfare) 
National  143.15    -1.98    -1.20  -1.63 -0.83 
Rural  138.25  -2.39  -1.50 -2.00 -1.14 
Urban  161.10  -0.66  -0.13  -0.37 0.11 
 
 Sen’s welfare  
Index 
National  3790  -4.75  -2.37  -3.95 -1.58 
Rural  3630  -5.23  -2.75 -4.41 -1.93 
Urban  4540  -1.32  0.22  -0.66 0.66 
Source: Own Computation from Micro data 
Notes:* Welfare indices in the no-policy case; ‘per-cent change NDCs vs no-policy 
When we look at the Jenkin’s social welfare effects, the first simulation brings a reduction of the 
base year values by 1.98%, 2.39% and 0.66% for the national, rural and urban population 
respectively.  The adverse effect of the policy on social welfare becomes smaller under the second 
and third simulation. We can see from the above table that the compensation plan results in a 
decline of national, rural and urban social welfare by 1.20%, 1.50% and 0.13% from the baseline 
respectively. Government spending with productivity scenario (simulation 3) has lower negative 
impact on welfare than government spending without productivity scenario (simulation 1). Also, 
compensation with productivity (simulation 4) better offsets the negative effects of the carbon tax 
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policy better than compensation without productivity (simulation 2).  
Sen’s welfare index shows a decline of base year values by 4.75%, 5.23%, and 1.32% for national, 
rural and urban households respectively under the first simulation. Under the second simulation, the 
national and rural index decreases by 2.37% and 2.75% from the base respectively, whereas the 
index for the urban population has shown a slight increase of the base value by 0.22% respectively. 
The introduction of government expenditure induced productivity gains (as in the last two 
simulations) has improved welfare compared to their respective counterparts in the first two 
simulations. Although the compensation scheme does not totally offset the negative impacts of 
carbon tax, it significantly reduces the incidences on welfare. The combination of compensation and 
productivity gains produce better results in offsetting the adverse effect of the policy on welfare. 
Despite the decrease in inequality under compensation and compensation with productivity 
(simulations 2 &4), the negative effect on welfare still prevails because welfare is also dependent on 
the mean expenditure level.  
3.4. Conclusion and Implications 
Ethiopia, in its INDC plan, sets an ambitious emission reduction target of 64% compared to the 
baseline in 2030. At the same time, the country plans to reduce poverty and enhance economic 
growth. This study is the first attempt proposing an assessment of the potential poverty and 
distributional consequences of achieving this target. The study starts from the results produced by a 
CGE model simulation in chapter 2 and   link them to micro data provided by the 2010/11 HCE 
multiple household survey dataset to estimate impacts on a set of poverty, inequality and welfare 
indicators. 
Four scenarios have been considered. The first represents the implementation of a carbon tax where 
the revenues are entirely absorbed by government expenditure.  The second represents the 
 62 | P a g e  
 
implementation of the carbon tax with lump sum transfer of 50% of the tax revenue to households 
and the remaining 50% to government expenditure. The third and fourth simulations introduce 
productivity changes that may arise from government expenditure in education and health sectors.  
We found that INDC policy for Ethiopia worsens all indicators even when positive effects from a 
“productive” government expenditure is considered. Adverse effects are more pronounced for the 
rural poor. The compensation plan produces a detectable reduction in adverse effects on poverty, 
and welfare, which, almost disappear in the fourth simulation.  
The results also highlight the particular vulnerability of the rural poor population. On one hand they 
are those which are hit most adversely by the policy due to their higher dependence of their income 
and then consumption upon emission intensive activities (agriculture and livestock), on the other 
hand they are also those who gain less from the redistribution scheme. This is because the existing 
government transfer allocation favors the urban poor which our exercise replicates. More in general, 
this points out the need to design appropriate measures to support rural households that, for 
instance, are much less able than the urban population to access and participate to education and 
health care projects.  
In conclusion, Ethiopia set an ambitious emission reduction objective that could imply a relevant 
cost in term of poverty increase, welfare and equality decrease. The impact on poverty and welfare 
can be partly, or even fully, offset by appropriate compensation schemes. But it is important to 
consider that this occurs mostly through a redistribution of resources within the society rather than 
through a lower contraction of the Ethiopian economic activity. Accordingly, more equity can be 
achieved, but within a poorer economy. This stresses the need for a substantive international 
support to Ethiopia mitigation policy that should be backed by solid pro-development policies.  
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
Appendix A. Model Basic Structure 
 
 
The starting core structure of the model used in this study is the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) CGE model (Lofgren, Harris, & Robinson, 2002).The model follows the 
neoclassical-structuralism modeling tradition. It is formulated as a set of simultaneous linear and 
non-linear equations, which define the behaviour of economic agents, as well as the economic 
environment in which these agents operate. This environment is described by market equilibrium 
conditions, macroeconomic balances, and dynamic updating equations. The model belongs to the 
recursive strand of the dynamic CGE literature, which implies that the behaviour of its agents is 
based on adaptive expectations, rather than on the forward-looking expectations that underlie 
alternative inter-temporal optimization models (Thurlow, 2008). 
 
Since a recursive model is solved one period at a time, it is possible to separate the within-period 
component from the between-period component, where the latter governs the dynamics of the 
model. 
 Within Period Specification20 
The within period component of the model describes a one period static CGE model. The standard 
CGE model explains all of the payments recorded in the country’s Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM21). The model therefore follows the SAM disaggregation of factors, activities, commodities, 
                                                 
20  This part entirely describes IFPRI’s standard CGE model, as described in (Lofgren, Harris, & Robinson, 2002).   
21 A SAM is a comprehensive and consistent, economy wide data framework or set of accounts that has 
detailed quantification for economic flows of incomes and expenditures in an economy, usually a nation, for 
a given period of time, mostly a year. It is the main data used for calibration in CGE modeling is the Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) (Thurlow & Van Seventer, 2002). Not only does a CGE take as its initial 
conditions the values appearing in the base-year SAM but also the parameters and coefficients of the various 
equations of the CGE are calibrated on the base-year SAM. In this sense, it can be said that a SAM provides 
the “navigation table” for a CGE (Thorbecke, 2000). It is an nxn square matrix in which each account is 
represented by a row and a column, which describes the flow of income among four different agents in the 
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and institutions written as a set of linear and non-linear simultaneous equations. The equations, 
most of which are non-linear, define the behaviour of the different actors in the economy. In part, 
this behaviour follows simple rules captured by fixed coefficients (for example, ad valorem tax 
rates). For production and consumption decisions, behaviour is captured by nonlinear, first-order 
optimality conditions-that is, production and consumption decisions are driven by the maximization 
of profits and utility, respectively. The equations also include a set of constraints that have to be 
satisfied by the system as a whole but are not necessarily considered by any individual actor. These 
constraints cover markets (for factors and commodities) and macroeconomic aggregates (balances 
for Savings-Investment, the government, and the current account of the rest of the world).  
Eventually, the equations in the model can be categorized under four blocks: prices, production and 
trade, institutions, and system constraints. The brief description of the blocks is presented below. 
The full and detailed description of the model is found in (Lofgren, Harris, & Robinson, 2002).  
 
Price Block 
The price block is made up of a rich system of equations in which endogenous model prices of 
commodities of different origins (imports, exports, domestically produced and sold goods ) are 
linked to other (endogenous or exogenous)  prices and to non-price model variables. The prices 
under this category include: import price, export price, demand price of domestic non-traded goods, 
absorption, marketed output value, activity price, aggregate intermediate input value, activity 
revenue and costs, and consumer price index and producer price index for non traded market output. 
Export and import prices are expressed in terms of local currency units. Absorption, which is the 
total domestic spending on a commodity, is valued at domestic demander prices.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
economy namely; the household, government, enterprises and rest of the world. Each cell in the SAM 
represents the payment from the column account to the row account. Given a double entry accounting 
principle, total income (row total) must equal total expenditures (column total) for each account (Lofgren, 
Harris, & Robinson, 2002).  
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Production and Trade Block 
This block covers four categories of equations: domestic production and usage of input; the 
allocation of domestic output to home consumption, the domestic market, and exports; the 
aggregation of supply to the domestic market; and the definition of the demand for trade inputs, that 
is generated by the distribution process. 
 
Production is carried out by activities that are assumed to maximize profits in a perfectly 
competitive market setting. The CGE model includes the first-order optimality conditions for profit-
maximization. A Leontief specification is chosen at the top level of the technology nest that 
determines the producer’s demand for the aggregate value added and intermediate inputs so that 
their quantitative shares remain constant. CES22 functions are specified for the rest of the 
technology nest at lower levels. Since the standard IFPRI model is not environmental CGE, we 
modified the production function for value added such that energy commodities are included as a 
composite input like other primary factors where composite energy in turn has a CES specification 
of energy inputs.  In fact, such modification may seem less relevant for an economy where more 
than 80% of emissions are output based (in Ethiopia, emissions from energy commodities that are 
identifiable from the SAM are less than 20 %).     
 
The composite supply (Armington) function characterizes the aggregation of supply to the domestic 
market in which imperfect substitutability between imports and domestic output sold domestically 
is captured by a CES aggregation function. The composite commodity that is supplied domestically 
is produced by domestic and imported commodities entering this function as inputs.  
 
                                                 
22 CES stands for Constant Elasticity of Substitution. The various elasticity parameters are taken from GTAP (Global 
Trade Analysis Project) database and other studies.   
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   Institutions Block 
The primary source of income for households and enterprises are factor returns generated during 
production. Households and enterprises earn factor incomes in proportion to the implied share that 
they control of each factor stock. Enterprises or firms are the sole recipient of capital income, which 
they transfer to households after having paid corporate taxes (based on fixed tax rates), saved (based 
on fixed savings rates), and remitted profits to the rest of the world. In addition to factor returns, 
which represent the bulk of household incomes, households also receive transfers from the 
government, other domestic institutions, and the rest of the world. Thus, the total income of any 
domestic nongovernment institution is the sum of factor incomes, transfers from other domestic 
nongovernment institutions, transfers from the government, and transfers from the rest of the world. 
 
It is assumed that each household maximizes a ‘’Stone-Geary’’ utility function subject to a 
consumption expenditure constraint. The CGE model is fed the corresponding first-order 
conditions, also called LES (linear expenditure system) functions.   
The government earns most of its income from taxes, and then spends it on consumption and 
transfers to households.  
System Constraints and Closure Rules 
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that demand for commodities equal supply. Aggregate 
demand for each commodity comprises household and government consumption spending, 
investment spending, and export and transaction services demand. Supply includes both domestic 
production and imported commodities. Equilibrium is attained through the endogenous interaction 
of domestic and foreign prices, and the effect that shifts in relative prices have on sectoral 
production and employment, and hence institutional incomes and demand. 
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The model includes three broad macroeconomic accounts: the current account, the government 
balance, and the savings and investment account. In order to bring about equilibrium in the various 
macro accounts and factor markets it is necessary to specify a set of closure rules, which provide a 
mechanism through which adjustment is assumed to take place. The choices made have no 
influence on the solution to the base simulation but will typically influence the results for other 
simulations. 
Government balance: Government balance is attained with Government savings (the difference 
between current government revenues and current government expenditures) being a flexible 
residual, while all tax rates are fixed. 
External accounts balance Real exchange rate is flexible while foreign savings (the current 
account deficit) is fixed. Given that all other items are fixed in the external balance (transfers 
between the rest of the world and domestic institutions), the trade balance is also fixed. If, ceteris 
paribus, foreign savings are below the exogenous level, a depreciation of the real exchange rate 
would correct this situation by simultaneously (i) reducing spending on imports (a fall in import 
quantities at fixed world prices) and (ii) increasing earnings from exports (an increase in export 
quantities at fixed world prices). 
Saving-investment balance: For the saving-investment balance, a saving driven investment closure 
is selected. In this closure rule, all non-government saving rates are fixed while investment adjusts 
to match the existing level of saving. The quantity of each commodity in the investment bundle is 
multiplied by a flexible scalar to ensure that the investment cost equals the savings value. 
Factor markets: Skilled labour is assumed fully employed while for unskilled and semiskilled 
labour categories, wages are fixed and the employment level adjusts to reach equilibrium in the 
labour market. All labour categories are mobile across sectors. Capital is fully employed and sector 
specific, so that capital returns adjust to reach equilibrium in the sector-specific market for capital. 
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The Between-Period Specification23 
While the static model describes the economy within a particular time-period, its inability to 
account for second-period considerations limits its assessment of the full effect of policy and non-
policy changes. For example, the model is unable to account for the second-period effect that 
changes in current investment have on the subsequent availability of capital. In attempting to 
overcome these limitations, the static model is extended to a recursive dynamic model in which 
selected parameters are updated based on the modeling of inter-temporal behaviour and results from 
previous periods. Current economic conditions, such as the availability of capital, are thus 
endogenously dependent on past outcomes, but remain unaffected by forward-looking expectations. 
The dynamic model is also exogenously updated to reflect demographic and technological changes 
that are based on observed or separately calculated projected trends. 
 
Over the time period being analyzed a number of policy-independent changes are assumed to take 
place. Together these effects form a projected or counterfactual growth path for the economy. These 
inter-period adjustments include population and labour force growth, capital accumulation, factor 
productivity changes, and changes in government expenditure. This section describes the dynamic 
extensions of the static model. 
Population Growth 
Population growth is exogenously imposed on the model based on separately calculated growth 
projections. It is clear that a growing population generates a higher level of consumption demand. 
There is assumed to be no change in the marginal rate of consumption for commodities, showing 
that new consumers have the same preferences as existing consumers. 
 
 
                                                 
23 This part entirely describes the dynamic CGE model in (Thurlow, 2008).  
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Capital Accumulation 
The process of capital accumulation is modeled endogenously, with previous-period investment 
generating new capital stock for the subsequent period. Although the allocation of new capital 
across sectors is influenced by each sector’s initial share of aggregate capital income, the final 
sectoral allocation of capital in the current period is dependent on the capital depreciation rate and 
on sectoral profit-rate differentials from the previous period (please see last part of the 
methodological appendix-dynamic updating of capital- for details). Sectors with above-average 
capital returns receive a larger share of investible funds than their share in capital income. The 
converse is true for sectors where capital returns are below-average. 
Labour Supply 
The method of updating the relevant parameters to reflect changes in labour supply in the current 
model depends on the labour market closure adopted for each labour category. Four alternative 
closure options are possible for each factor market. In the first case, labour supply is flexible but 
constrained in its ability to adjust by the real wage elasticity of labour supply. No exogenous 
updating of labour supply is necessary, since labour supply adjusts endogenously to determine final 
employment and wages. In the second closure option,  sectoral demand for a labour category is held 
fixed, and any adjustments in demand following changes in labour supply are exogenous. In this 
case it is assumed that growth in supply is the same across all sectors. In the third closure option, 
labour is assumed to be unemployed at a fixed real wage. This represents a special case of the first 
closure option when the wage elasticity of labour supply is infinity. Therefore the exogenous 
adjustment of labour supply is unnecessary since there are no constraints on factor supply. Rather it 
is necessary to exogenously adjust real wages. The fourth closure option assumes that factor supply 
is fixed and the real wage adjusts to equate demand and supply. This final closure, the one selected 
in this study, implies full employment. Between-periods the fixed level of labour supply is adjusted 
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exogenously. This also represents a special case of the first closure where the wage elasticity of 
labour supply is zero. 
Total Factor Specific Productivity Growth 
Along with changes in factor supply, the dynamic model also takes into consideration changes in 
factor productivity. This is done by multiplying the efficiency parameter in the CES value-added 
function by the percentage change in total factor productivity (TFP).  
 
Government Consumption and Transfer Spending 
Since government consumption spending and transfers to households are fixed in real terms within 
a particular period, it is necessary to exogenously increase these payments between periods. This is 
done by increasing the value of the base year quantity of government demand and the amount of 
transfer from government to institutions, such as households. 
 
A. Stationary emissions  
 From production activities:  
ea
ea
ea
ENERGYEA
EMISEA
coefEA
0
0
      
where eacoefEA is input emission coefficient, eaEMISEA0  is quantity of emission by activity a from 
using energy commodity e (initial value), and eaENERGYEA  is value of energy commodity e used 
by activity a (initial value). 
 From households 
eh
eh
eh
ENERGYEH
EMISEH
coefEH
0
0
      
Where ehcoefEH  is household stationary emission coefficient, ehEMISEH 0 is (initial) quantity of 
carbon emission by household h from consuming commodity e, and ehENERGYEH0  is value of 
energy commodity e consumed by household h. 
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B. Activity emissions 
 For production activities (producers): 
a
a
a
QA
EMISA
coefA
0
0
     
where acoefA is activity emission coefficient per birr worth of output produced; aEMISA0  is (initial) 
value of carbon emission by activity a (initial value) whose sources are not found in the commodity 
accounts of the SAM; and aQA0 is output (initial value) produced by activity a. 
 For households: 
h
h
h
QH
EMISH
coefH
0
0
      
where hcoefH is household activity emission coefficient per birr worth of consumption; hEMISH0  
is the (initial) quantity of carbon emission by households whose sources are not found in the 
commodity accounts of the SAM; and hQH 0 is consumption (initial value) of household h. 
 
As noted earlier, the emission coefficients are calculated from the emission matrix and SAM data. 
Then the model uses these emission coefficients to generate producer and household emissions. 
The following blocks of equations are the newly added ones to the standard IFPRI model equations. 
Stationary emissions:   
For producers: eaeaea ENERGYEAcoefEAEMISEA *      
For Consumers: eheaea ENERGYEHcoefEHEMISEH *      
Activity emissions:  
For producers: aaa QAcoefAEMISA *        
For consumers: hah QHcoefHEMISH *        
Total quantity of emissions of producer a ( aTEMISA ):    
ae eaa
EMISAEMISEATEMISA                         
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Total quantity of carbon emissions of household h ( hTCEMISH ):  
he ehh
EMISHEMISEHTEMISH         
Total quantity of emissions of all production activities (TEMISA ):  
 a aTEMISATEMISA          
Total quantity of emissions of all households (TEMISH ): 
 h hTEMISHTEMISH          
Total quantity of emissions in the economy (TEMIS ):  
TEMISHTEMISATEMIS          
 
 
Appendix B: Mathematical Summary statement for CGE Model 
 
 
 Static Model Specification (Extended IFPRI’s Standard Computable General Equilibrium Model)  
 
Definition of Sets, Parameters and Variables 
SETS    
α ∈ A                             activities 
         α ∈ ACES(⊂ A)    activities with a CES function at the top of the  
 technology nest 
α ∈ ALEO(⊂ A)             a ctivities with a Leontief function at the top of the technology nest 
c ∈ C                             commodities 
c ∈ CD(⊂ C)                  commodities with domestic sales of domestic output 
c ∈ CDN(⊂ C)               commodities not in CD 
c ∈ CE(⊂ C)                   exported commodites 
c ∈ CEN(⊂ C)                commodities not in CE 
c ∈ CM(⊂ C)                  imported commodities 
c ∈ CMN(⊂ C)               commodities not in CM 
c ∈ CT(⊂ C)                   transactions service commodities 
c ∈ CX(⊂ C)                  commodities with domestic production 
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f ∈ F                               factors 
 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸(⊂ F)  energy factors 
i∈ INS                            institutions (domestic and rest of the world) 
i∈ INSD(⊂ INS)             domestic institutions 
i∈ INSDNG(⊂ INSD)     domestic nongovernment intuitions 
en∈EN(⊂ INSDNG)              Enterprises 
h∈H(⊂ INSDNG)              households 
PARAMETERS 
Latin Letters 
cwtsc                      weight of commodity c in the CPI 
 dwtsc                                          weight of commodity c in the producer price index 
icaca                              quantity of c as intermediate input per unit of activity a 
icdcc’                              quantity of commodity c as trade input per unit of c’        produced 
and sold domestically 
 icecc’                             quantity of commodity c as trade input per exported unit  
     if c’ 
icmcc’                            quantity of commodity c as trade input per imported unit of c’ 
intaa                              quantity of aggregate intermediate input per activity unit  
ivaa                                quantity of value-added per activity unit 
𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                             base saving rate for domestic institution i  
mps01c                          0-1 parameter with 1 for institutions with potentially fixed direct tax 
rates 
pwec                           export price (foreign currency) 
pwmc    import price (foreign currency) 
qdstc    quantity of stock change 
𝑞𝑔𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅     base-year quantity of government demand 
𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅    base-year quantity of private investment demand 
Shifi f    share of domestic institution i in income of factor f 
Shiiii’   share of net income of i’ to i (i’ ∈ INSDNG’; i ∈ INSDNG) 
Shareh share of carbon tax revenue allocated for households 
Sharegh transfer share of household h to total household transfer by 
government 
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Shg share of allocated carbon tax revenue to total government 
consumption 
tαα    tax rate for activity a 
tec    export tax rate 
tff     direct tax for factor f 
𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅     exogenous tax rate for domestic institution i 
tins01i   0-1 parameter with 1 for institutions with potentially fixed tax rates 
tmc    import tariff rate 
tqc    rate of sales tax 
trnsfrif    transfer from factor f to institution i 
tvaa    rate of value-added tax for activity a 
Greek Letters 
𝛼𝛼
𝛼    efficiency parameter in the CES activity function 
𝛼𝛼
𝑣𝛼    efficiency parameter in the CES value-added function 
𝛼𝑎
𝑒    efficiency parameter in the CES energy aggregation function 
𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝑐   shift parameter for domestic commodity aggregation fuction 
𝛼𝑐
𝑞
    Armington function shift parameter 
𝛼𝑐
𝑡    CET function shift parameter  
𝛽𝑎𝑐ℎ
ℎ    marginal share of consumption spending on home commodity c  from 
activity a for household h 
𝛿𝑎
𝑎    CES activity function share parameter  
𝛿𝑎 𝑐
𝑎𝑐    share parameter for domestic commodity aggregation function 
𝛿𝑐
𝑞
    Armington function share parameter  
𝛿𝑐
𝑡    CET function share parameter 
𝛿𝑓𝑎
𝑣𝑎    CES value-added function share parameter for factor f in activity a 
𝛿𝑒𝑎
𝑒𝑎    CES energy function share parameter for energy e in activity a 
𝛶𝑐 ℎ
𝑚    subsistence consumption of marketed commodity c for household h 
𝛶𝑎𝑐 ℎ
ℎ    subsistence consumption of home commodity c from activity a for 
household h 
𝜃𝑎𝑐    yield of output c per unit of activity a 
ρ
𝑎
𝑎    CES function exponent 
ρ
𝑎
𝑣𝑎    CES value-added function exponent 
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ρ
𝑎
𝑒𝑎    CES energy aggregation function exponent 
ρ
𝑐
𝑎𝑐    domestic commodity aggregation function exponent 
ρ
𝑐
𝑞    Armington function exponent  
ρ
𝑐
𝑡     CET function exponent 
pemis  price of emission 
        eacoefEA                    emission coefficient of activity a from using energy commodity e to produce Qa 
       ehcoefEH                     emission coefficient of household h from using energy commodity e 
        acoefA                      emission coefficient of activity a to produce QA whose sources are not  
                                        precisely known in the SAM 
        hcoefH                    emission coefficient of household h from using energy commodity e whose  
                                     sources are not precisely known in the SAM 
 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
𝐶𝑃𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅    consumer price index 
𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   change in domestic institution tax share (= 0 for base; exogenous 
variable) 
𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅    foreign savings (FCU) 
𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅    government consumption adjustment factor 
𝐼𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅     investment adjustment factor 
𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   savings rate scaling factor (= 0 for base) 
𝑄𝐹𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓    quantity supplied of factor 
𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    direct tax scaling factor (= 0 for base; exogenous variable) 
 𝑊𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑎   wage distortion factor for factor f in activity a 
 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
DMPS   change in domestic institution saving rates (= 0 for base; exogenous 
variable) 
DPI     produce price index for domestic marketed output  
EG    government expenditures 
𝐸𝐻ℎ    consumption spending for household 
EXR    exchange rate (LCU per unit of FCU) 
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GOVSHR   government consumption share in nominal absorption 
GSAV    government savings 
INVSHR   investment share in nominal absorption  
𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖   marginal propensity to save for domestic non-government institution 
(exogenous variable) 
𝑃𝐴𝑎   activity price (unit gross revenue) 
𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑐   domestic for commodity produced and sold domestically 
𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑐   supply price for commodity produced and sold domestically 
𝑃𝐸𝑐    export price (domestic currency) 
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑐   aggregate intermediate input price for activity a 
𝑃𝑀𝑐    import price (domestic currency) 
𝑃𝑄𝑐    composite commodity price 
𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑎    value-added price (factor income per unit of activity) 
𝑃𝑋𝑐    aggregate producer price for commodity  
𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎𝑐    producer price of commodity c for activity a 
        𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑒𝑎  Price of energy input e from used by activity a 
        𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑎    aggregate price of energy input used by activity a  
𝑄𝐴𝑎    quantity (level) of activity 
𝑄𝐷𝑐    quantity sold domestically of domestic output 
𝑄𝐸𝑐    quantity of exports 
𝑄𝐹𝑓𝑎     quantity demanded of factor f from activity a 
        𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑒𝑎  quantity demanded of energy input e from activity a 
        𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑎   quantity aggregate energy input  
𝑄𝐺𝑐    government consumption demand for commodity 
𝑄𝐻𝑐ℎ    quantity consumed of commodity c by household h 
𝑄𝐻𝐴𝑎𝑐ℎ   quantity of household home consumption of commodity c from 
activity a for household h 
𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎   quantity of aggregate intermediate input 
𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑐𝑎    quantity of commodity c as intermediate input to activity a 
𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐    quantity of investment demand for commodity 
𝑄𝑀𝑐    quantity of imports of commodity 
𝑄𝑄𝑐   quantity of goods supplied to domestic market (composite supply) 
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𝑄𝑇𝑐    quantity of commodity demanded as trade input 
𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎      quantity of (aggregate) value-added  
𝑄𝑋𝑐   aggregated marketed quantity of domestic output of commodity 
𝑄𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎𝑐   quantity of marketed output of commodity c from activity a 
TABS    total nominal absorption 
𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖    direct tax rate for institution i (i ∈ INSDNG)            
𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖′   transfers from institution i’ to i (both in the set INSDNG) 
𝑊𝐹𝑓    average price of factor f 
 𝑌𝐹𝑓    income of factor f 
YG    government revenue  
𝑌𝑒𝑛    income of enterprises 
𝑌ℎ    income of households 
𝑌𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑓   income of domestic institution i from factor f  
EMISSA(a)        emission by activity a from using commodity c 
 EMISSH(h)        emission by household h fro consuming commodity c 
EMISA(a)        emission by activity a not in EMISSA(a) 
 EMISH(h)        emission by household h not in EMISSH(h) 
TEMISA(a)    Total emission of activity a 
TEMISH(h)    Total emission of household h 
TEMISA(a)    Total emission of all activities  
TEMISH(h)    Total emission of all households  
  TEMIS         total emission in the economy 
  ATAXCa(a)     carbon tax collected from activity a 
  ATAXCh(h)   Carbon tax collected from household h 
  TOTREVC      total environmental tax revenue 
 
 
EQUATIONS 
Price Block 
Import Price 
 𝑃𝑀𝑐  =  𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑐 . (1 + 𝑡𝑚𝑐 ) .  𝐸𝑋𝑅 + ∑ 𝑃𝑄c’ . 𝑖𝑐𝑚c’c c’∈CT ;     c ∈ CM            (1) 
Export Price 
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 𝑃𝐸𝑐  =  𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑐 . (1 − 𝑡𝑒𝑐  ) .  𝐸𝑋𝑅 − ∑ 𝑃𝑄c’ . 𝑖𝑐𝑒c’c c’∈CT ;           c ∈ CE           (2) 
Demand price of domestic non traded goods 
 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑐  =  𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑐 + ∑ 𝑃𝑄c’ . 𝑖𝑐𝑑c’c c’∈CT ;                                        c ∈ CD         (3) 
Absorption 
 𝑃𝑄𝑐. (1 − 𝑡𝑞𝑐). 𝑄𝑄𝑐   =  𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑐 .   𝑄𝐷𝑐 +   𝑃𝑀𝑐  .  𝑄𝑀𝑐;   c ∈ (CD ∪ CM)      (4) 
Marketed output value 
 𝑃𝑋𝑐 .  𝑄𝑋𝑐   =  𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑐. 𝑄𝐷𝑐 + 𝑃𝐸𝑐. 𝑄𝐸𝑐;                                    c ∈ CX             (5) 
 
Activity price 
 𝑃𝐴𝑎  = ∑ 𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎c . 𝜃𝑎c c ∈C ;                                                       𝑎 ∈ A             (6) 
Aggregate intermediate input price 
 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎  = ∑ 𝑃𝑄c . 𝑖𝑐𝑎c𝑎 c ∈C ;                                                   𝑎 ∈ A             (7) 
Activity revenue and costs 
 𝑃𝐴𝑎 .  ( 1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑎) .  𝑄𝐴𝑎  =  𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑎.  𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎 +  𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎 .  𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎;                                                                          
where    𝑡𝑎𝑎 = ATAXCA(a)/QA(a)                                                                               (8) 
Consumer price index 
 𝐶𝑃𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  = ∑ 𝑃𝑄c . 𝑐𝑤𝑡𝑠c c ∈C ;                                                                                 (9) 
Producer price index for nontrade market output 
 𝐷𝑃𝐼 = ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝑆c . 𝑑𝑤𝑡𝑠c c ∈C ;                                                                                 (10) 
 
Production and Trade Block 
CES technology: Activity production function  
 𝑄𝐴𝑎 =  𝛼𝑎
𝑎 . (𝛿𝑎 
𝑎 .  𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎 
 −𝜌𝑎 
𝑎
+  (1 − 𝛿𝑎 
𝑎 ) . 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎 
 −𝜌𝑎 
𝑎
 )
1
 𝜌𝑎
𝑎
 ;    a∈ 𝐴𝐶𝐸𝑆        (11) 
CES technology: Value-added intermediate input quantity ratio 
 
𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎
𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎
 =  (
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎
𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑎
 .
𝛿𝑎 
𝑎
1 − 𝛿𝑎 
𝑎  )  
1
 1−𝜌𝑎 
𝑎
;                                     𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝐶𝐸𝑆             (12) 
Leontief technology: Demand for aggregate value-added  
 𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎 =  𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑎 . 𝑄𝐴𝑎;                                                               𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑂             (13) 
Leontief technology: Demand for aggregate intermediate input  
 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎 =  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑎 . 𝑄𝐴𝑎;                                                         𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑂             (14) 
Value added and factor demands  
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 𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎 =  𝛼𝑎
𝑣𝑎 . (∑ 𝛿𝑓𝑎 
𝑣𝑎  . 𝑄𝐹𝑓𝑎 
–𝜌𝑎 
𝑣𝑎
  𝑓 ∈𝐹 )
  
− 
1
𝜌𝑎 
𝑣𝑎
;                                 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴             (15) 
Energy aggregation    
 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑎 =  𝛼𝑎
𝑒 . (∑ 𝛿𝑒𝑎 
𝑒𝑎  . 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑒𝑎 
–𝜌𝑎 
𝑒𝑎
  𝑒 ∈𝐸 )
  
− 
1
𝜌𝑎 
𝑒𝑎
    𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 ⊂ F; 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴   (16) 
Energy input demand 
 𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑒 𝑎 =  𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑎  . 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑎. 
 (∑ 𝛿𝑒𝑎 
𝑒𝑎  . 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑒𝑎 
–𝜌𝑎 
𝑒𝑎
  𝑒 ∈𝐸 )
 −1
 . 𝛿𝑒𝑎 
𝑒𝑎  . 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑒𝑎 
–𝜌𝑎 
𝑒𝑎−1
         𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 ⊂ F; 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴  (17) 
 
Factor demand 
 𝑊𝐹𝑓 . 𝑊𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅? 𝑎 =  𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑎(1 −  𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑎  ) . 𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎 
 (∑ 𝛿𝑓𝑎 
𝑣𝑎  . 𝑄𝐹𝑓𝑎 
–𝜌𝑎 
𝑣𝑎
  𝑓 ∈𝐹 )
 −1
 . 𝛿𝑓𝑎 
𝑣𝑎  . 𝑄𝐹𝑓𝑎 
–𝜌𝑎 
𝑣𝑎−1
 ;                  𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 ;  𝑓 ∈ 𝐹          (18) 
Aggregate intermediate input demand 
 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑐 𝑎 =  𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐 𝑎 . 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴 𝑎;                                            𝑎 ∈ 𝐴; 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶           (19) 
Commodity production and allocation 
 𝑄𝑋𝐴𝐶 𝑎 𝑐  +  ∑  ℎ ∈𝐻 𝑄𝐻𝐴 𝑎 𝑐 ℎ =   𝜃 𝑎𝑐 . 𝑄𝐴 𝑎;                𝑎 ∈ 𝐴; 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶X           (20) 
Output aggregation function 
 𝑄𝑋c =  𝛼𝑐
𝑎𝑐 . (∑  𝛿𝑎𝑐 
𝑎𝑐  .𝑎 ∈A  𝑄𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎 𝑐 
−𝜌𝑐 
𝑎𝑐
 )
 
1
 𝜌𝑐 
𝛼𝑐− 1
;                          𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑋           (21) 
First order condition  for output aggregation function 
 𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶ac =  𝑃𝑋c .  𝑄𝑋c (∑  𝛿𝑎𝑐 
𝑎𝑐  .𝑎 ∈𝐴’  𝑄𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎 𝑐 
–𝜌𝑐 
𝑎𝑐
 )
−1
.  
 𝛿𝑎𝑐 
𝑎𝑐  . 𝑄𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎 𝑐 
−𝜌𝑐 
𝑎𝑐−1
;                                                         𝑎 ∈ 𝐴;  𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑋        (22) 
Output transformation (CET) function 
 QXc =  𝛼𝑐 
𝑡 (𝛿𝑐 
𝑡  . 𝑄𝐸 𝑐 
𝜌𝑐 
𝑡
+  (1 − 𝛿𝑐 
𝑡 ) . 𝑄𝐷 𝑐 
𝜌𝑐 
𝑡
 )
1
𝜌𝑐 
𝑡
;           𝑐 ∈ (𝐶𝐸 ⊂ 𝐶𝐷)          (23) 
Export-domestic supply ratio 
 
𝑄𝐸c
𝑄𝐷c
 =  (
𝑃𝐸c
𝑃𝐷𝑆c
 .
1−𝛿𝑐 
𝑡
 𝛿𝑐 
𝑡  )  
1
 𝜌𝑐 
𝑡 −1;                                              𝑐 ∈ (𝐶𝐸 ⋂ 𝐶𝐷)          (24) 
Output transformation for non-exported commodities  
 𝑄𝑋𝑐 =  𝑄𝐷𝑐 + 𝑄𝐸𝑐;                   𝑐 ∈ (𝐶𝐷 ⋂ 𝐶𝐸𝑁)  ∪ 𝑐 ∈ (𝐶𝐸 ⋂  𝐶𝐷𝑁)         (25) 
Composite supply (Armington) function 
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 𝑄𝑄c =  𝛼𝑐 
𝑞 (𝛿𝑐 
𝑞 .  𝑄𝑀𝑐 
−𝜌𝑐 
𝑞
+  (1 − 𝛿𝑐 
𝑞). 𝑄𝐷𝑐 
−𝜌𝑐 
𝑞
 )
1
𝜌𝑐 
𝑞
;      𝑐 ∈ (𝐶𝑀 ⋂ 𝐶𝐷)        (26) 
Import-domestic demand ratio 
 
𝑄𝑀c
𝑄𝐷c
 =  (
𝑃𝐷𝐷c
𝑃𝑀c
 .
𝛿𝑐 
𝑞
1− 𝛿𝑐 
𝑞  )  
1
 1+𝜌𝑐 
𝑞
 ;                                            𝑐 ∈ (𝐶𝑀 ⋂ 𝐶𝐷)        (27) 
Composite supply for non-imported outputs and non-produced imports 
 QQc =  QDc +  QMc;                 𝑐 ∈ (𝐶𝐷 ⋂ 𝐶𝑀𝑁)  ∪ 𝑐 ∈ (𝐶𝑀 ⋂  𝐶𝐷𝑁)        (28) 
Demand for transactions services 
 𝑄𝑇𝑐 = ∑ (𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑐𝑐’ . 𝑄𝑀𝑐’ . 𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑐’ .  𝑄𝐸𝑐’ + 𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑐’  . 𝑄𝐷𝑐’) 𝑐’∈𝐶’ ;         𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑇    (29) 
 
Institution Block 
Factor income  
 𝑌𝐹𝑓 = ∑ 𝑊𝐹𝑓  𝑎∈𝐴  . 𝑊𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅? 𝑎 .  𝑄𝐹𝑓 𝑎;                                        𝑓 ∈ 𝐹       (30) 
Institutional factor incomes 
           𝑌𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑓 =  𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑓  .  [(1 − 𝑡𝑓𝑓) .  𝑌𝐹𝑓 −  𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤 𝑓 .  𝐸𝑋𝑅]; 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷;  𝑓 ∈ 𝐹  ( 31) 
Income of domestic, nongovernment institutions 
 𝑌𝑒𝑛 =  ∑ 𝑌𝐼𝐹𝑒𝑛𝑓 𝑓∈𝐹 + ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖 𝑖’ 𝑒𝑛’∈𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺’ +  𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑛  𝑔𝑜𝑣 .  
             𝐶𝑃𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ +  𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑛 𝑟𝑜𝑤 .  𝐸𝑋𝑅 +;                                              𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺         (32) 
𝑌ℎ =  ∑ 𝑌𝐼𝐹ℎ𝑓 
𝑓∈𝐹
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖 𝑖’ 
𝑖’∈𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺’
+  (𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟ℎ  𝑔𝑜𝑣 + 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑔ℎ. 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐶)  
             𝐶𝑃𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ +  𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟ℎ 𝑟𝑜𝑤 .  𝐸𝑋𝑅                                                       ℎ ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺           (33) 
Intra-institutional transfers 
 𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖 𝑖’ =  𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖’  .  (1 − 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖’ ) .  (1 − 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆 𝑖’ ) .  𝑌𝐼𝑖’ ;    𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺                  (34) 
Household consumption expenditure 
 𝐸𝐻ℎ =  (1 − ∑ 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 ℎ 𝑖∈𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺  ) .  (1 − 𝑀𝑃𝑆 ℎ  ) .   
             (1 − 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆 ℎ  ). (𝑌𝐼 ℎ − 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐻(ℎ));                                         h ∈ 𝐻                       (35) 
Household consumption demand for marketed commodities   
 𝑃𝑄𝑐  . 𝑄𝐻𝑐 ℎ = 𝑃𝑄𝑐 . 𝛾𝑐 ℎ 
𝑚 +  𝛽𝑐 ℎ 
𝑚  . (𝐸𝐻ℎ   −  ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐’  𝑐’ ∈ 𝐶 .  𝛾𝑐 ℎ 
𝑚 −
  ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎 𝑐’ . 𝛾 𝑎 𝑐’ ℎ
ℎ
 𝑐’∈𝐶𝑎 ∈𝐴 );      c ∈ 𝐶 ; h ∈ 𝐻     (36)                                                                                                                                                     
Household consumption demand for home commodities 
 𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎 𝑐  𝑄𝐻𝐴𝑎𝑐 ℎ = 𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎𝑐 . 𝛾𝑎 𝑐 ℎ 
ℎ +  𝛽𝑎 𝑐 ℎ 
ℎ .  
      (𝐸𝐻ℎ   −  ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐’  𝑐’ ∈ 𝐶 .  𝛾𝑐 ℎ 
𝑚 −   ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎 𝑐’ . 𝛾 𝑎 𝑐’ ℎ
ℎ
 𝑐’∈𝐶𝑎 ∈𝐴 );   c ∈ 𝐶;∈ 𝐻                   (37) 
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Investment demand  
 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉 𝑐 =  𝐼𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  . 𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑣̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑐 ;                                                                         c ∈ 𝐶              (38) 
Government consumption demand  
𝑄𝐺 𝑐 =  ((1 + 𝑠ℎ𝑔). 𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  . 𝑞𝑔̅̅̅̅ 𝑐 ;                 c ∈ 𝐶                  (39) 
Government revenue  
 𝑌𝐺 =  ∑ 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖  .𝑖∈𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺  𝑌𝐼𝑖  +  ∑ 𝑡𝑓𝑓  .𝑓∈𝐹  𝑌𝐹𝑓  + ∑ 𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑎  .𝑎∈𝐴  
  𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑎   .  𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎  + ∑ 𝑡𝑎𝑎  .𝑎∈𝐴  𝑃𝐴𝑎   .  𝑄𝐴𝑎  + H ATAXCh(h) +  ∑ 𝑡𝑚𝑐 .𝑐∈𝐶𝑀  𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑐    
 . 𝑄𝑀𝑐  .  𝐸𝑋𝑅 +  ∑ 𝑡𝑒𝑐  .𝑐∈𝐶𝑀  𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑐   .  𝑄𝐸𝑐   .  𝐸𝑋𝑅 +  ∑ 𝑡𝑞𝑐  .𝑐∈𝐶  𝑃𝑄𝑐  
 .  𝑄𝑄𝑐  +  ∑ 𝑌𝐼𝐹𝑔𝑜𝑣  𝑓   𝑐∈𝐶 +  𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣    𝑟𝑜𝑤  .  𝐸𝑋𝑅                                                    (40) 
 
 
Government expenditures 
     𝐸𝐺 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐  .𝑐∈𝐶  𝑄𝐺𝑐  +   ∑ 𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑖  𝑔𝑜𝑣  .𝑖∈𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺  𝐶𝑃𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                                                 (41) 
 
System Constraint Block 
Factor market  
 ∑ 𝑄𝐹𝑓 𝑎  𝑎∈𝐴 =   𝑄𝐹𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓  ;                                                                            𝑓 ∈ 𝐹                      (42) 
Composite commodity markets 
 𝑄𝑄𝑐  =  ∑ 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑐 𝑎  𝑎∈𝐴 +  ∑ 𝑄𝐻𝑐 ℎ  ℎ∈𝐻 +  𝑄𝐺𝑐  
 + 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐 +  𝑞𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑐  +   𝑄𝑇𝑐 ;                                                         c ∈ 𝐶                      (43) 
Current account balance for rest of the world (in foreign currency)  
 ∑ 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑐𝑐  .  𝑐∈𝐶𝑀 𝑄𝑀𝑐 + ∑ 𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤   𝑓𝑓∈𝐹 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑐   .𝑐∈𝐶𝐸   
 𝑄𝐸𝑐 +  ∑ 𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑖  𝑟𝑜𝑤 𝑐∈𝐶𝐸 +  𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ;                                                            (44) 
Government balance 
 𝑌𝐺 =  𝐸𝐺 + 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑉                                                                                        (45) 
Direct institutional tax rates 
 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 =  𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖 .(1 + 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  .  𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑠01𝑖 ) +  𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 𝑡𝑖 ;  i ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺       (46)  
Institutional savings rates   
           𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖 = 𝑚𝑝𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 .(1 + 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐽̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 𝑚𝑝𝑠01𝑖 ) + 𝐷𝑀𝑃𝑆. 𝑚𝑝𝑠01𝑖 ; i ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺       (47)  
Savings-Investment Balance 
 ∑ 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖  .  𝑖∈𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺 (1 − 𝑇𝑁𝑆𝑖 ) . 𝑌𝐼𝑖 +  𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑉 + 
             𝐸𝑋𝑅 . 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  =   ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐  . 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐 +𝑐∈𝐶 ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐 . 𝑞𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑐   𝑐∈𝐶                                  (48) 
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Total absorption  
 𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆 =  ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐 𝑐∈𝐶ℎ∈𝐻 . 𝑄𝐻𝑐 ℎ +  ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎 𝑐ℎ∈𝐻𝑐∈𝐶𝑎∈𝐴  .  
           𝑄𝐻𝐴𝑎  𝑐 ℎ + ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐  .𝑐∈𝐶 𝑄𝐺𝑐 + ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐  .𝑐∈𝐶 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐 + ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐  .𝑐∈𝐶 𝑞𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑐                        (49) 
Ratio of investment to absorption  
        𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝐻𝑅 . 𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐  .  𝑐∈𝐶 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐 +  ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐  .  𝑐∈𝐶 𝑞𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑐                                (50) 
Ratio of government consumption to absorption  
      𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑆𝐻𝑅 . 𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐  .  𝑐∈𝐶 𝑄𝐺𝑐                                                                                 (51) 
 Emission Block 
eaeaea ENERGYEAcoefEAEMISEA *                     (52)
eheaea ENERGYEHcoefEHEMISEH *                                             (53) 
              (54) 
hah QHcoefHEMISH *                   (55)  
ae eaa
EMISAEMISEATEMISA                      (56) 
he ehh
EMISHEMISEHTEMISH                     (57) 
 a aTEMISATEMISA                      (58) 
 h hTEMISHTEMISH                     (59) 
TEMISHTEMISATEMIS                     (60) 
 )( *PEMIS = ATAXCa(a) EMISAEMISCA
c ca
                                                                (61) 
 )(*PEMIS ATAXCh(h) hc ch EMISHEMISCH               (62) 
 TOTREVC = A ATAXCa(a)  + H ATAXCh(h)                                                             (63) 
 
 Dynamic Updating of Capital  
Economy-wide rental rate of capital 
𝐴𝑊𝐹𝑓𝑡
𝑎 =  ∑ [(
𝑄𝐹𝑓𝑎𝑡
∑ 𝑄𝐹𝑓𝑎′𝑡𝑎′
) . 𝑊𝐹𝑓𝑡.  𝑊𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑓𝑎𝑡]𝑎 ;  
                                                            f  is capital; a ∈ 𝐴;     a’ ∈ 𝐴;     t ∈ 𝑇                  (64) 
Sectoral share of new capital investment  
 𝜂𝑓𝑎𝑡
𝑎 =  (
𝑄𝐹𝑓𝑎𝑡
∑ 𝑄𝐹𝑓𝑎′𝑡𝑎′
) . (𝛽𝑎 (
𝑊𝐹𝑓,𝑡 .  𝑊𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑓𝑎𝑡
 𝐴𝑊𝐹𝑓𝑡
𝑎 − 1) + 1)  
                                                                f  is capital; a ∈ 𝐴;     a’ ∈ 𝐴;     t ∈ 𝑇                  (65) 
Final quantity of new capital allocated to each sector  
 ∆𝐾𝑓𝑎𝑡
𝑎 =  𝜂𝑓𝑎𝑡
𝑎  .
∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐𝑡 .  𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑡𝑐
𝑃𝐾𝑓𝑡
 ;        f  is capital; a ∈ 𝐴;     c ∈ 𝐶;      t ∈ 𝑇                    (66) 
Unit price of capital 
aaa QAcoefAEMISA *
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     𝑃𝐾𝑓𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐𝑡𝑐  .
𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑡
∑ 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐′𝑡𝑐′
 ;  f  is capital; a ∈ 𝐴;   c ∈ 𝐶;  𝑐′ ∈ 𝐶;   t ∈ 𝑇        (67) 
Sectoral quantities of capital 
 𝑄𝐹𝑓 𝑎𝑡+1 = 𝑄𝐹𝑓 𝑎𝑡 . (1 +  
∆𝐾𝑓𝑎𝑡
𝑎
 𝑄𝐹𝑓 𝑎𝑡
− υ𝑓 );        f  is capital; a ∈ 𝐴;      t ∈ 𝑇                  (68) 
The new aggregate quantity of capital 
 𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑓 𝑡+1 = 𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑓 𝑡 . (1 +  
∑ ∆𝐾𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑎
𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑓 𝑡
− υ𝑓 );   f  is capital; a ∈ 𝐴;      t ∈ 𝑇                  (69) 
